US Navy - discussione ufficiale

[holmes7]

Primo Harpoon lanciato. Il Poseidon mette i denti!

 

http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/fedbiz_daily/2013/07/boeings-p-8-poseidon-fires-first.html

[TT-1 Pinto]

Imminente il lancio del secondo satellite della "costellazione" MUOS ....

 

Second MUOS Set For July 19 Launch ....

 

The U.S. Navy is planning to loft its second in a series of next-generation narrowband communications satellites on Friday, July 19.

The United Launch Alliance Atlas V is slated to boost the second Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) spacecraft during a 44-min. launch window that opens at 8:48 a.m. EDT from Cape Canaveral.

 

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_16_2013_p0-597497.xml

 

Lockheed Martin .... http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2013/july/0716-ss-MUOS-2Pre.html

 

Department of the Navy .... http://acquisition.navy.mil/rda/media/files/programs/muos

 

 

The second satellite of the Mobile User Objective System constellation will launch in July from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla.

Four satellites and one on-orbit spare will comprise the constellation, which will provide service worldwide.

 

 

[TT-1 Pinto]

Scompare, alla ragguardevole età di 94 anni, il Vice Ammiraglio (a riposo) Eugene Wilkinson, primo comandante del primo sottomarino a energia nucleare Nautilus ....

 

 

Riding Atomic Fire Beneath the Waves ....

 

Retired vice admiral Eugene Wilkinson, the first commanding officer of the world’s first nuclear submarine, died last Thursday at age 94.

 

Fonte .... http://nation.time.com/2013/07/18/riding-atomic-fire-beneath-the-waves/

 

 

[TT-1 Pinto]

Il secondo satellite MUOS è stato lanciato ....

 

Atlas V launches US Navy communications satellite ....

 

A United Launch Alliance (ULA) Atlas V has successfully launched a (MUOS) communications satellite for the US Navy.

 

Fonte .... http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/atlas-v-launches-us-navy-communications-satellite-388496/

 

Inoltre .... AW&ST .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_19_2013_p0-598729.xml

Modificato 19 Luglio 2013 da TT-1 Pinto

[fabio-22raptor]

Un occhio al futuro e alla 6th generation

 

Fonte: Defence News:

 

 

WASHINGTON — The makeup of the US Navy’s carrier air wings will start to shift in a few years as the F-35C joint strike fighter begins to enter service. The typical carrier flight deck will see both F-35s and F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets in operation. But thoughts already are turning to what lies beyond the F-35’s fifth-generation aviation technology, to the planes that in the 2030s will begin to replace the F/A-18s flying with US and international services.

Rear Adm. Bill Moran, the Navy’s director of air warfare in the Pentagon, offered his thoughts on the future aircraft, dubbed the F/A-XX, during an interview in the Pentagon.

Q. Where are you today on what you think the sixth-generation aircraft is?

A. We don’t talk in terms of generations of airplanes. It’s really ill-defined in my view, and mostly wrapped around stealth technology. So we are not in the business of trying to design and build a sixth-generation air wing. I do not even talk about sixth generation. But I do talk about where our aircraft quantities start to run out of service life.

The bulk of our force today are Super Hornets and they will be there for a long time, out until the end of the 2020s, early 2030s timeframe. But then that need starts to occur when the airplanes reach 9,000 hours of service life. When that happens, we are either going to buy a bunch more F-35Cs, or we are going to have to start looking at capability that we can replace the capability set, the mission set that the F/A-18 E/Fs do today.

We are taking an approach called FA-XX. We’ll [start a study] next year that would assess all those missions the F/A-18 E/F plugs into, in the air wing. How could we capture those capabilities in another way instead of buying another very high-end, very expensive platform replacement? Certainly there will be platforms involved, but do they have to be platforms that look and feel and operate much like an F/A-18 E/F or an F-35 does today? Could it be done differently? Could we do the mission sets different?

For example, we talk a lot to NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] about future designs being more of a truck that has an open architecture design, so you can plug different sensors, different payloads and weapons into that for a specific mission, and be able to move those sensors and payloads around so you can do multiple different missions on different days, or different sorties, instead of trying to build everything into a jet — that becomes very expensive.

It is very much in line with [the direction of Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations], where he talked about payloads over platforms. In other words, the payload piece is what is important. Getting the right payload in the right place, at the right time is also critical. But what kind of truck that payload rides around on is what we are really after.

So we want to look holistically at all of the things that contribute to a mission. They include space-based. They include other platforms that are already part of the air wing — E-2D Hawkeyes, EA-18G Growlers — and the rotary wing component. How do we do a system-of-systems look across all of those platforms, and decide what capability gaps we need to cover as the F/A-18 E/Fs start to fall off?

Now we try to tell industry that we are just opening up the aperture to have a conversation about what they think the art of the possible is. I have had some great discussions with industry partners about this. Do not just look to walk in here with a new design, a sixth-generation aircraft. I am not interested in that conversation yet. I am interested in what are the technologies that you think you can bring? And specifically propulsion, which drives future capability. That is the timeline driver. If you are looking at a game-changing propulsion capability, whether it is long dwell, fast and high, all of those types of attributes to a propulsion capability, we have got to start working that now to lead to whatever the truck looks like.

And as you are developing that propulsion capability, then you can start to look at what kind of payloads? What kind of sensors? What kind of integrating capability that you want to develop across the air wing, so you continue to have the same effect of a different shape, a different mix of an air wing in the future.

Q. Do you think about unmanned aerial vehicles?

A. You could look at small UAVs launched off a truck that do different mission sets currently done by larger platforms that are very costly or expensive. There are lots of [concept of operations] questions that come into play as we study this. And of course, now you are trying to project a threat that is in the 2030s and ’40s and even in the ’50s — and what that threat could evolve to. That is going to drive a lot of how you view what the air wing ought to look like that far out.

So it really is our opportunity right now, while we are building F-35s, while we are continuing to mature F/A-18 E/Fs to deal with the ’20s and ’30s. What are we looking at beyond that?

When you look at normal development plans that take an average of 17 years for aviation, we are at that point right now if we are truly going to get to a 2030 capability. But we are not bought into [whether] it has to be a high-end fighter, or a high-end anything. What we do know is that we need to design it to allow us the most flexibility in how we operate that, whatever it is in the future.

Do not wait for us to tell you line by line what the requirement is. We are way too early in that. I need to understand what you think are the possibilities in propulsion, sensors, networks, architecture. All of those things have to be designed into whatever this thing might look like in the future.

Q. You issued a request for information (RFI) about a year ago for the next fighter. What were the responses?

A. Official responses are highly classified; we are parsing through with a team at NAVAIR and in our Special Programs branch. And they are intriguing. They run the gamut of, here is our aircraft design of the future, to here is a capability design of the future. And somewhere in there is our trade space and how we are going to view this.

But again, it just opens up the conversation. We are very early in this. And what we hope to do is now take that process into an analysis of alternatives, a formal AOA, that will take a couple of years to complete because it is very complex. We hope to get it started in 2014.

Q. The logical responders to the RFI would be Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman. Are you interested also in hearing from conceptual groups, not necessarily aircraft manufacturers?

A. The major folks have all jumped in, and to the degree to which we have maybe some others that might want to contribute in a different way, I could not tell you right now. But I want to hear from people who think completely outside our normal acquisition process.

Q. What is your thinking about a manned versus unmanned fighter?

A. What we said in the RFI was, we want you to think manned, unmanned and optionally manned. We are not trying to drive a solution here. And we recognize there might be different mixes of those options that are more effective in the ’30s and ’40s than what we have today. But we want to understand why you think that. What are the capabilities they bring? And then let’s have a discussion.

Q. Are you driving to introduce an aircraft around 2030?

A. Yes. See, everybody wants to dive right back into, do you want a platform? And my answer is, I know I am going to start to lose the capability set that Super Hornet brings to the air wing today, starting in the late ’20s or early ’30s. So what capabilities can we start designing that replace that, the mission sets that the Super Hornet does today? When you think there are at least nine or 10 different missions the Super Hornet contributes to today, does it have to be done by the same very advanced, complex capable airplane platform?

Q. Do you envision that say, in 2040, the FA-XX will completely replace the F-35 along with the Super Hornets? Or will it serve alongside the F-35?

A. This effort is not at all to replace the F-35 — it is almost if you flip it upside down. When you look out in the ’30s and ’40s, what we are aiming to do is to complement what the F-35 brings, much like the F-35 will complement what the F-18s currently bring and deliver in the air wing. Today, there is a graceful, gradual replacing of legacy Hornets with F-35s. As the F-18 population starts to run out of service life, we have got to bring in a new capability that complements what the F-35 brings.

[holmes7]

Nuova generazione di laser, sembra molto piu potenti di quelli attuali.

 

http://www.lansingstatejournal.com/article/20130728/NEWS01/307280084/Niowave-prepares-test-next-generation-laser-U-S-Navy

 

 

[holmes7]

Nuovi materiali in arrivo.

 

http://www.extremetech.com/computing/162568-new-material-identified-by-us-navy-could-revolutionize-computer-chip-heat-dissipation

[fabio-22raptor]

Riduzione delle Carrier?

 

Fonte: Defense News

 

 

 

A US Navy With Only 8 Carriers? The Drastic Consequences of Hagel's Fleet Options

WASHINGTON — At first, the statement is shocking. “Reduce the number of carrier strike groups from 11 to 8 or 9, draw down the Marine Corps from 182,000 to between 150,000 and 175,000.”

But those words July 31 from US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel brought into the open some of the behind-the-scenes discussions that have been going on at the Pentagon for months. Senior Defense Department officials continue to stress no decisions have been made out of the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), but the everything-is-on-the-table nature of the discussions is becoming clearer.

Or is it? Beyond top-line statements, hardly any real details were released, leaving those outside the inner circles to speculate on the immediate and far-reaching effects of sequestration. One reason, many observers feel, is that talking about a specific potential cut could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even acknowledging that an eight-carrier fleet is on the table, some fear, could turn that once-unthinkable idea into a reality.

And it’s not just about cutting carriers — it’s air wings with seven or so squadrons of aircraft, it’s a cruiser and three or four destroyers, and it’s the crews. Substantial savings would be found from reducing nearly 10,000 personnel billets with the elimination of each strike group.

Reducing the air wings would ease carrier acquisition, maintenance and recapitalization. The fleet of legacy F/A-18 Hornet aircraft – mostly C models — could be swiftly retired, leaving an all-Super Hornet fleet of Es and Fs that itself could be smaller than what exists today. Retirement of older SH-60 helicopters could also be accelerated.

Dropping the carrier fleet could be done several ways. Two or three ships could simply be ordered to go — likely the oldest ships that have not undergone a refueling overhaul. The older Nimitz-class ships — Nimitz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson and Theodore Roosevelt — are likely safe, having completed their reactor refueling. Abraham Lincoln, which has just begun its overhaul at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Va., is likely safe, as the three-year effort has already been largely paid for. But the George Washington, set to begin its refueling overhaul in 2015, would likely go, along with the John C. Stennis and possibly the Harry S. Truman.

Spreading out the current five-year carrier building schedule is dangerous, and could actually lead to increased costs that would cancel out any savings. Significant portions of the carrier supply base are barely sustainable under the current schedule, and some suppliers can be expected to go out of business should the building time be stretched any further. Newport News, faced with the loss of the refueling overhauls and a longer building time, would be forced to lay off several thousand workers, again increasing costs for new ships.

Carriers also have a significant disposal cost. The eight-reactor Enterprise, now in the early stages of a multiyear disposal process, will likely cost more than $1.1 billion to ultimately dispose of. Nimitz-class carriers have only two reactors and could cost less to dispose of, but the bill still will be significant and, with inflation, would likely exceed the Big E’s cost.

Even laying up the carriers in mothballs will entail major costs. Reactors, once shut down for a significant time, cannot be restarted due to changes in their metallurgy, so the ships cannot be completely shut down and maintained in reserve.

Rather, the reactors would be set to a minimum level and the ships kept at a secure facility, like an active naval base. The Navy already has a significant backlog of seven decommissioned conventional carriers to get rid of, and the nukes would likely sit for some years before actually going away.

Fate of the Warships

The Navy’s 22 remaining Aegis cruisers are on the back-half of their projected 30-35 year careers, and the service already is trying to decommission seven.

The first Arleigh Burke-class destroyer entered service in 1991, and the Aegis ships are still being built. Complicating the decision about which ships would be cut are expensive modernization upgrades to the older ships, most of which have already received a ballistic-missile defense (BMD) capability — a key requirement among most regional combatant commanders.

For littoral combat ships, contract options to build them run through LCS 24, and the Navy is considering how to approach the rest of the planned 52-ship force. Options include eliminating one of the two LCS variants or ending the program at 24.

Cutting the Navy Department means cutting the Marine Corps, which inevitably leads to fewer amphibious ships. While the Navy seeks a 10 or 11-ship big-deck amphibious force, nine are in service today. Peleliu, the oldest assault ship, already is to be replaced by the new America. A reduction to eight big decks would likely mean the Wasp — about to begin a sorely-needed $110 million modernization overhaul — would be decommissioned.

Construction of the eleventh and last of the highly capable LPD 17 San Antonio class of amphibious transport docks has begun at HII’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., and the ships are nearly as effective as the bigger assault ships, so they would likely survive.

But the older dock landing ships of the Whidbey Island class would be on the chopping block — as would be their LSD(X) replacement.

Submarines

Pentagon support for the nuclear attack submarine force seems to be stronger than ever, and the number of SSNs is not likely to diminish. But the Navy’s desire to incorporate a Virginia Payload Module (VPM) with four large weapon tubes into Block V Virginia-class ships is threatened. Each VPM would add about $350 million to the cost of each sub, but without the modifications the four SSGN guided-missile submarines will retire in the 2020s without a replacement.

Also to be decided is the fate of the Ohio-class replacement submarine, a major acquisition effort sitting squarely in the middle of future shipbuilding budgets. The first ship isn’t scheduled to be ordered until 2021, but development costs are significant.

Future modernization programs also are at significant risk under the various SCMR options. The Air Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) to be installed in an Arleigh Burke Flight III version beginning in 2016 is threatened and could be delayed, despite urgent requirements for the BMD mission.

As for infrastructure, a fleet that would drop below 250 or 230 ships would also need fewer bases or support facilities. With the shift to the Pacific, whereby 60 percent of the fleet will be Pacific-based, several facilities could close. Targets would likely include the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, and Mayport Naval Station in Florida, as well as lesser facilities.

The shipbuilding industry could shift as well. The most striking change could be a joining of the two biggest shipbuilders, HII and General Dynamics. Such a move would probably mean the closure of one or two of the five major yards operated by the two companies. The upshot would mean less competition for Navy contracts, something the service would not welcome.

[holmes7]

Test per propulsione ibrida

 

http://defensetech.org/2013/08/06/navy-to-test-hybrid-propulsion-on-destroyers/

[TT-1 Pinto]

 

Laser navale LaWS (Laser Weapon System) ....

 

Watch the Navy’s New Ship-Mounted Laser Cannon Kill a Drone ....

 

The tubular Laser Weapon System (LaWS) is a solid-state laser that’s been in development for six years, at a cost of $40 million.

It’s a directed-energy descendent of the the radar-guided Close In Weapons System (CIWS; it rhymes with “Gee Whiz”) gun already aboard surface ships.

 

Fonte .... http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/laser-warfare-system/

 

 

 

Un lungo articolo sull'ultimo numero del settimanale britannico Jane's Defence Weekly, che fa il punto sulla situazione della ricerca nel campo dei laser navali, si conclude con queste considerazioni ....

 

LaWS’s forthcoming deployment on board Ponce – two years ahead of the ONR’s (Office of Naval Research) original schedule – will inform the debate, and marks a significant step forward for the USN’s SSL (Solid-State Laser) weapon programme.

Yet there should be no doubting that more work needs to be done before the fleetwide fielding of viable, fully engineered HEL (High-Energy Laser) weapons becomes a reality; for example, total ownwership costs remain unquantified, performance in marginal weather is unknown, and combat control interfaces are as yet undefined.

The promise is in sight, but not quite yet within reach.

 

La strada è, dunque, ancora lunga ....

[TT-1 Pinto]

 

Si negozia per la Kennedy ....

 

Shipbuilding CEO Sees Fixed-Price Incentive Contract For CVN-79 Carrier ....

 

While the Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) Newport News Shipbuilding unit continues to build the next-generation CVN-78 Ford-class carrier, the company and U.S. Navy are negotiating for the deal to construct the next ship, CVN-79 John F. Kennedy.

 

Fonte .... http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/asd_08_08_2013_p03-01-604894.xml

 

 

Per la figlia del presidente, Caroline, appena nominata ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti in Giappone, si prospetta, per la seconda volta nella sua vita, di fare da madrina ad una portaerei che porterà nuovamente il nome del padre ....

 

 

[holmes7]

Varato il quarto cutter della guardia costiera

 

http://www.sunherald.com/2013/08/12/4868363/ingalls-shipbuilding-launches.html

[madmike]

Rapporto di luglio del GAO sulle LCS:

 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656194.pdf

 

Il titolo è significativo:

 

Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost

 

le conclusioni, pure.

 

 

Significant questions remain about the LCS program and its underlying business case, even as seaframe and mission package procurements continue. Elements of the LCS business case—including its cost and its anticipated capabilities—have degraded over time. Given the program’s cost growth and schedule delays, the congressional cost cap has increased from $220 million in fiscal year 2006, to $480 million in fiscal year 2010 per ship.87The Navy plans to meet the threshold performance levels for the ASW package in 2016. This is the first and only increment of that module.

Expected capabilities have lessened from optimistic, early assumptions to more tempered and reserved assumptions. While more explicit examples of specific capabilities that changed are classified, table 1 depicts some significant examples of the changes in Navy statements about LCS’s capability from early in the program to today.

La tabella di cui si parla è assolutamente esemplificativa.

Modificato 17 Agosto 2013 da madmike

[holmes7]

I rapporti del GAO lasciano il tempo che trovano basta ricordare quello sull'F18E/F e altri programmi.

 

Costituiscono degli "snapshot" come quando si legge un balance sheet di una azienda.

Un trimestre dopo e' tutto cambiato, magari in peggio ma forse in meglio.

 

Peraltro l'aspetto piu importante di tutto il programma sta diventando di anno in anno, non la nave in se, ma i moduli e le tecnologie che si vanno sviluppando. Dai rotor-drones, ai semi-submersible unmanned underwater vehicle, unmanned underwater vehicles, autonomous remote multi-mission vehicle......e via dicendo.

 

Entro 5-7 anni tutte questi sistemi matureranno e saranno portati ad un livello di piena operativita. A quel punto la LCS sara una piattaforma avanzata con costi di esercizio contenuti da cui lanciare drones ed elicotteri in scenari a bassa/media intensita e/o routinari.

[madmike]

ah ecco: lasciano il tempo che trovano.

 

questa mancava.

[holmes7]

Lasciano il tempo che trovano perche vanno considerate le potenzialita nello spazio temporale e non la fotografia del momento.

In moltissimi casi le due cose non coincidono.

[madmike]

potenzialità nello spazio temporale.

[Unholy]

Per cortesia, non andiamo a cascare nello stesso andamento di altri 3D...

O si aggiungono commenti utili e con fonti attenbdibili o evitiamo di postare.

[holmes7]

Lungo articolo di Aviation week sul programma LCS che continua ad avere la fiducia dei vertici della US NAVY. Sembra che i costi lievitati fortemente negli anni passati siano stati finalmente messi sotto controllo, e l'attenzione sia spostata ora sui "moduli di missione".

 

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_08_19_2013_p0-607790.xml&p=1

Modificato 20 Agosto 2013 da holmes7

[madmike]

E' un articolo di commento al rapporto del GAO che ho postato qualche giorno fa.

 

Peraltro, le magagne evidenziate sono quelle note:

 

“Oh my God did we do the requirements quickly, and did we deliver it fast,” Ailes says. The problem, he says, is that systems weren’t as mature as Navy officials had believed. “We’ve had do to some work finishing them.”

The RMMV is performing better now, he says, but the Navy is looking to receive and test sonar upgrades this year. “The Q20 sonar is pretty old,” Ailes says. “It finds mines; the problem is reliability. The thing was just terrible; after 35 hours, it would die.”

“The Navy was looking for capability,” says Stephen Froelich, Palm Beach site manager and director and general manager of mission and unmanned systems for Lockheed Martin, which developed the RMMV. “The decision was made [about five years ago] to move it off the DDGs.”

While the essential operations are the same, Froelich says, he points out that the DDGs are larger and had more sailors to maneuver and maintain the RMMV. The unmanned underwater vehicle also was recovered via a side door on the destroyer, while LCS operations call for it to be brought aboard the stern, where interaction between the ship and sea is different.

“Survivability testing is important because it can reveal equipment or system failures that may necessitate class-wide design changes,” GAO says. “The Navy is not satisfied that it understands how the aluminum used on both variants will respond to shock and fire, or how the Independence-class trimaran hull will react to underwater shocks.”

Meanwhile, the “limited testing” so far has revealed deficiencies with core ship systems on both variants, GAO says, such as performance problems with the 57-mm guns, the integrated capability of the combat systems and the radars’ ability to identify and maintain a fix on targets.

Developmental testing thus far — specially for the systems comprising the MCM module — has shown continued performance problems, according to GAO. Some of these systems do not meet their own performance requirements, which does not provide assurance that LCS-specific threshold requirement targets will be met when they are operated together in a mission module.

 

a cui viene risposto così:

 

Navy officials say GAO, and sometimes the DOT&E, simply do not understand or appreciate some of the technological underpinnings of the LCS systems, and the real importance of that technology to mine warfare

 

sono gli altri che non capiscono....

 

beh, diciamo che è un modo che pare davvero fanciullesco di affrontare la cosa.

 

Sul fatto che la USN abbia fiducia sul programma, ricordo che ogni FFAA ha fiducia nei suoi programmi in corso: fino a che non li cancella. Il Nlos-LS citato nell'articolo ne è la prova, senza andare a cercare tanto oltre.

 

Prendere quindi le parole di difesa della USN come 'prova' che le cose vanno bene, non è significativo, esattamente come prendere le parole della LM. Sono addentro al programma, fino a quando (nel caso) non decidono di uscirne.

 

I problemi sono appunto evidenziati da enti terzi e super partes (che attenzione: hanno accesso a dati riservati, non sono giornalisti). Se la difesa è 'non capiscono', siamo a posto.

[holmes7]

sono gli altri che non capiscono....

 

 

Un bean counter del GAO non e' un ufficiale di marina, ne un esperto di guerra navale ne ha mai testato da vicino questi sistemi d'arma.

 

Sul fatto che la USN abbia fiducia sul programma, ricordo che ogni FFAA ha fiducia nei suoi programmi in corso: fino a che non li cancella. Il Nlos-LS citato nell'articolo ne è la prova, senza andare a cercare tanto oltre.

 

 

Il missile NLOS era un programma dell'US ARMY, progettato e testato per le loro specifiche. La marina pensava sarebbe stato impiegabile per la LCS ma quando i test gestiti dall'esercito diedero esito negativo non se ne fece piu nulla.

 

I programmi vengono cancellati prima che la produzione di serie raggiunga numeri ragguardevoli. Nel caso delle LCS siamo gia alla 17esima unita ordinata.......e' un po tardi per "cancellare".

 

 

Prendere quindi le parole di difesa della USN come 'prova' che le cose vanno bene

 

 

Vuole prendere come "prova" quelle della LM e della Austal ? Secondo lei sono piu attendibili quelle della marina o di queste societa?

 

non è significativo, esattamente come prendere le parole della LM.

 

 

Vabbe la solita trama nera della LM che ha sotto il proprio controllo tutto l'ammiragliato della US NAVY.

 

 

Sono addentro al programma, fino a quando (nel caso) non decidono di uscirne.

 

I problemi sono appunto evidenziati da enti terzi e super partes (che attenzione: hanno accesso a dati riservati, non sono giornalisti). Se la difesa è 'non capiscono', siamo a posto.

 

 

Gli unici che sono addentro al programma sono i militari che hanno potuto verificare in prima persona tutto l'hardware che gli e' stato consegnato e impiegarlo per anni. Lo stesso e' avvenuto con altre unita precedenti, dalle San Antonio, alle Burke, alle Perry a suo tempo soggetti di critiche e scetticismo.

Questo uno dei tanti documenti sui deficit riscontrati nella classe Burke, uno dei migliori cacciatorpedinieri del mondo.

https://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2007%20Proceedings%20Documents/Automation%20and%20Controls%202007/1-1-50%20Paper.pdf

 

Questo un vecchio rapporto del GAO (1979) sulla classe Oliver Perry

http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/108301.pdf

 

Leggete bene, sono le stesse identiche obiezioni sollevate per le LCS. Nave troppo vulnerabile, costi in crescita, equipaggiamento non idoneo, personale di bordo insufficiente, design tecnico non all'altezza.....e via dicendo.

 

 

 

Modificato 21 Agosto 2013 da holmes7

[madmike]

Ma infatti le Perry, con tutto il rispetto, non erano certo buone navi. Lo dimostra il fatto che le spagnole e le australiane hanno avuto problemi per anni, e queste ultime sono state radiate, in alcuni casi, dopo una ventina di anni di servizio.

 

La USN ha fatto anche di peggio, allungandole dopo averne gia messe in servizio un discreto numero, e radiandole in fretta e furia (o cedendole a paesi amici) a fine guerra fredda.

 

E comunque è, al solito, un confronto che non regge: erano navi fatte in un altra epoca, per altri scopi, e il cui principale requisito era costare poco, ed essere in gran numero.

 

Qui, le cose sono diverse.

[holmes7]

Ma infatti le Perry, con tutto il rispetto, non erano certo buone navi. Lo dimostra il fatto che le spagnole e le australiane hanno avuto problemi per anni, e queste ultime sono state radiate, in alcuni casi, dopo una ventina di anni di servizio.

 

La USN ha fatto anche di peggio, allungandole dopo averne gia messe in servizio un discreto numero, e radiandole in fretta e furia (o cedendole a paesi amici) a fine guerra fredda.

 

E comunque è, al solito, un confronto che non regge: erano navi fatte in un altra epoca, per altri scopi, e il cui principale requisito era costare poco, ed essere in gran numero.

 

Qui, le cose sono diverse.

 

 

Le fregate non sono mai state una grande priorita per la Us navy che vorrei ricordarlo non e' nemmeno lontanamente paragonabile per numeri e potenziale alle marine europee, le quali al contrario hanno sempre dato grande importanza a questo tipo di unita.

 

Quindi qui si parte da un presupposto che non esiste.

 

Quanto fossero valide le Oliver Perry e' difficile dirlo perche non sono state impiegate (fortunatamente) nel ruolo che era stato loro assegnato, vale a dire il contrasto antisom nelle regioni oceaniche.

 

Quello che e' certo e' che ci furono rapporti negativi durante la loro progettazione cosi come ce ne sono per le LCS (e altre unita), ma cio nonostante furono finanziate e messe in servizio.

 

Con le LCS non si e' voluto costruire una fregata classica all' europea, perche la marina dispone di circa 150 unita da attacco con un dislocamento superiore alle 7mila tonn. Per intenderci, tutte le altre marine della NATO messe insieme schierano meno di 10 unita che hanno le stesse caratteristiche !!

 

Costruire quindi una Fremm sarebbe stato inutile. I costi di esercizio e la flessibilita operativa sfavorevoli.

[madmike]

Perfetto: ma tutto questo discorso non c'entra assolutamente nulla con i problemi delle LCS e il presunto 'benestare' della USN che come detto, e come per tutte le FFAA, è tale fino a che non si cambia idea.

 

banalmente:

 

http://afpprinceton.com/2011/04/america%E2%80%99s-vanishing-military-how-acquisition-failures-threaten-u-s-military-might/

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Abandoned_military_projects_of_the_United_States

[holmes7]

Perfetto: ma tutto questo discorso non c'entra assolutamente nulla con i problemi delle LCS e il presunto 'benestare' della USN che come detto, e come per tutte le FFAA, è tale fino a che non si cambia idea.

 

banalmente:

 

http://afpprinceton.com/2011/04/america%E2%80%99s-vanishing-military-how-acquisition-failures-threaten-u-s-military-might/

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Abandoned_military_projects_of_the_United_States

 

 

 

Si puo cambire idea nel momento in cui si individuano delle alternative, che per costo/prestazioni/quantita sono migliori (F22 vs F35).

 

Nel caso delle LCS al momento queste alternative non esistono, almeno di non voler procedere con la costruzione di 3 unita diverse (cacciamine, antisom, pattugliatore). Non esiste nessuna garanzia sul fatto che tali alternative avranno un prezzo inferiore o un costo di esercizio piu basso, del resto se una LCS scarsamente armata costa circa mezzo miliardo di dollari, una Fremm "americana" ne costerebbe quasi il doppio.

Modificato 21 Agosto 2013 da holmes7