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La faranno una guerra in iran secondo voi?  

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  1. 1. La faranno una guerra in iran secondo voi?

    • si
    • no
    • per me assassineranno il presidente e non la faranno

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In qualche parte del Mondo (un paese a caso, chissà quale! :adorazione:smilewlafranciaya0.gif) ancora non ci si dimentica di ciò che è avvenuto in Iran!!!


Eccovi il link ad un articolo (testo + video):




Cento punti a favore dei cittadini d'oltralpe.


Il video pultroppo non è più disponibile, la didascalia indica che è stato "ritirato", ti pare possibile?


Se non sbaglio questo è il sito del gruppo che ha organizzato l'evento.



Edited by -{-Legolas-}-

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Il video pultroppo non è più disponibile, la didascalia indica che è stato "ritirato", ti pare possibile?


Sì, è normale, Euronews tiene on-line i filmati brevi per poco tempo; resta, poi, solo il testo del video.

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i servizi segreti tedeschi e francesi dicono che tra sei mesi l'Iran fara' un test nucleare.Perche' Israele non ha attaccato gli impianti nucleari dell'Iran?Anche senza l'aiuto americano ritarderebbero il test nucleare di due o tre anni

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inizio questa discussione segnalando An Open Source Look at Iran’s Intelligence Ministry http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2013/01/mois_loc.html (un articolo con diversi e interessanti link per approfondire il tema spionaggio)



Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security is believed to employ more than 30,000 intelligence officers and support personnel, making it “one of the largest and most active intelligence agencies in the Middle East,” according to a new report from the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.

“The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) uses all means at its disposal to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran, utilizing such methods as infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissent, arresting alleged spies and dissidents, exposing conspiracies deemed threatening, and maintaining liaison with other foreign intelligence agencies as well as with organizations that protect the Islamic Republic’s interests around the world,” the report states.

See “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,” December 2012.

The report was first obtained and reported by Bill Gertz in “Iran Spy Network 30,000 Strong,” Washington Free Beacon, January 3, 2013.

The new report provides an informative account of the Ministry’s history, organizational structure, and recruitment practices, as far as these can be discerned from published sources.

“The information in this report was collected mainly from Farsi and English journals, online news Web sites, and Iranian blogs,” the Preface states. (Some older information from the FAS web site is cited at a couple of points.)

“Needless to say, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security does not publish information about its activities on Iranian Web sites. Consequently, in the absence of official government information, this report occasionally relies on social media, in particular blogs, as a source of information more than might ordinarily be warranted. The reliability of blog-based information may be questionable at times, but it seems prudent to evaluate and present it in the absence of alternatives.”

“Every minister of intelligence must hold a degree in ijtihad (the ability to interpret Islamic sources such as the Quran and the words of the Prophet and imams) from a religious school, abstain from membership in any political party or group, have a reputation for personal integrity, and possess a strong political and management background,” the report says.

A newly disclosed U.S. Army intelligence document explains how to determine whether weapons that were captured in Iraq were manufactured in Iran.

Iranian weapons systems “have several distinctive visual identification markings that identify their source” which are described in the Army publication. The document was partially declassified last month and was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Matthew Schroeder of the FAS Arms Sales Monitoring Project.

See “Identifying Small Arms and RPGs Produced in Iran,” U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, 2004.



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... segnalo questo (lungo) paper: US AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION - The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula http://csis.org/files/publication/120228_Iran_Ch_VI_Gulf_State.pdf



The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula is the most important single theater in the US-Iranian strategic competition. The proximity of the Arab Gulf states to Iran; the region’s geostrategic value to the stability of the global economy; the shifting military balance; and the social, demographic, and economic tensions that threaten to create political upheavals in several key states make it a potential flash-point in tensions between Washington and Tehran.


While each state in the region has unique challenges, several overarching issues shape the significance of the region:
- Natural Resources: The large reserves of oil and natural gas in the Arabian Peninsula make the security and stability of the region of vital importance to the US. Three of the world’s top 10 producers of oil are located on the peninsula – Saudi Arabia (1), the United Arab Emirates (7) and Kuwait (10).1
- The size of proved oil reserves in many of these states also ensures that these countries will continue to be major players in the global oil trade so long as there is demand. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia ha the largest proven oil reserves of any country in the world, with 17% of the world total. Kuwait and the UAE follow with the sixth and seventhlargest
proved reserves, comprising 6.8 and 6.4% of the world total, respectively.
- While any estimates of oil and gas reserves as a percent of the world total are highly uncertain, the BP Statistical Review of Energy for 2012 estimates that the GCC states have 19.2% of the world oil reserves versus 9.1% for Iran and 8.7% for Iraq.3 Some estimates put the GCC shares of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves as high as 45%, with the potential to rise steadily in the future.


The region also has key natural gas producers – namely Qatar and Saudi Arabia, The BP Statistical Review of Energy for 2012 estimates that the GCC states have 20.4% of world gas reserves versus 15.9% for Iran and 1.7% for Iraq.5 Some estimates indicate that the GCC has 17% of the world’s conventional gas reserves.6 In terms of proved reserves of natural gas, Qatar has the world’s third-largest and Saudi Arabia the fourth-largest – 12-13% and 3.9-4% of the world total, respectively. Saudi Arabia also has extensive mineral resources.


Geography: Geography is significant to the importance of the Arabian Peninsula for multiple reasons. The close proximity between the Gulf Arab states and Iran shape the competition. All of the Arab states are in close range of Iranian missile, air, and naval capabilities. The presence of US military assets and facilities throughout the peninsula exacerbates this threat, as these states may be viewed by Iran as targets for retaliation in the event of a preventative US or Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear infrastructure.


The Strait of Hormuz – which passes between the UAE, Oman, and Iran – is an essential passageway for maritime commerce from the east coast of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE to the outside world. Roughly 35% of all oil moved via ocean and 20% of all internationally traded oil passes through the Strait – some 17 million barrels daily. According to the US Energy Information Administration, “The Strait of Hormuz is by far the world’s most important chokepoint [for oil trade].

- Sunni and Shia Tension: Iran is a Persian Shia state with a different language than the Gulf Arab states, and is an ambitious foe seeking regional and religious dominance. Each of the Arab Gulf states has a relatively significant Shia population – particularly Bahrain, where Shia have a majority. In several countries, the Shia portion of the population sees itself as being socially, politically, and economically less well-off than their Sunni brethren. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the UAE, and – to a lesser extent – Kuwait, the governments have been concerned about the ability of their Shia to cause social unrest. They are also concerned about Iranian links to these communities, and possible infiltration of these populations to undermine the Sunni leadership of the states, particularly by Hezbollah and the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).


- Reluctance to Back an Escalation in Tensions with Iran: While all of the Gulf states – with the exception of Oman – have Sunni leadership and are troubled about Iran’s nuclear program and the ties between their Shia and Iran, many are reluctant to back a US-Iranian confrontation unless they are fully convinced that Iran is a real nuclear threat and that the US will act decisively
and be successful.

Each of these issues affects US and Iranian competition in the Gulf states at a time when this competition is only one of the critical factors shaping their security. This competition interacts with religious extremism and terrorism; internal sectarian, ethnic, and tribal
divisions;; the need to deal with massive demographic pressures and a “youth bulge” that requires the creation of massive numbers of jobs and new social infrastructure; and the need for stable political and social evolution to avoid political upheavals that can do as
much or more to disrupt reform and modernization as to achieve it.

They also affect security at a time when the US and the Gulf allies must shift from a past focus on conventional warfare and compartmented internal security efforts to a spectrum of four interactive challenges:
- Internal security, counterterrorism (CT), and civil-military stability operations – often involving outside powers and arms transfers.
- Low to mid-level asymmetric wars that may involve conventional forces.

- Conventional wars using asymmetric means

- Use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), weapons of mass effectiveness, and cyberwarfare – wild card patterns of conflict and escalation.

Both the US and its security partners in the GCC states must deal with all of these issues at a time when security means dealing with the emergence of complex or hybrid warfare which can occur at many different levels without clear probabilities – other than opponents like Iran and violent extremists who will seek to exploit any perceived weaknesses and do so as cheaply as possible. Each Gulf state must also individually and collectively deal with enduring political, social, and economic pressures that threaten its
stability and that of its neighbors. These are pressures where the US and outside powers can have limited influence, but where success or failure will occur on a largely national and local basis.


The US and the Arab Gulf States: Challenges and Interests

Ever since the early 1970s, the US has sought to protect and secure the stable flow of oil and gas exports at world market prices, promote security and stability in the region, forge useful military cooperation programs to advance broader US strategic aims, and
encourage economic development and trade while protecting trade lanes. Iran’s unconventional military developments and nuclear weapons program pose a risk to each of these interests, and thus to the ability for the US to advance its own national security
and global economic stability.

In the more than sixty years that the US has been actively engaged in the region, Washington has advanced these interests through numerous variations of alliances and containment. Saudi Arabia played an important role – along with Iran – in the US strategy to contain the Soviet Union.10 As a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran began to emerge as the major regional threat to US regional interests. The Iran-Iraq War, the Iran hostage crisis, various acts of terrorism, and the Iranian targeting of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf made this threat real, while the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the US to focus more on containing Iran. At the same time, the aggression displayed by Saddam Hussein during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the brief Iraqi incursion into Saudi Arabia demonstrated that an ambitious and hostile Ba’athist regime in Baghdad was also a threat to US security interests in the Gulf.
The US characterized the decade that followed in terms of “dual containment,” when the US sought to limit hostility from both Baghdad and Tehran. Economic sanctions and a no-fly zone were put into effect to mitigate against future Iraqi hostility, while Washington remained cautious of developments in Iran11 and built up the militaries of the Gulf Arab states.
The Iraqi threat to Gulf security ended after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but created a new Iraqi threat to the US. While Iraq once had the fifth-largest army in the world,12 the US invasion destroyed Iraq’s forces while triggering a mix of clashing Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish factions and an insurgency hostile to the US. This – followed by the election of the conservative Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and growing concern with the Iranian nuclear program – has made the containment of Iran the principal strategic objective of the US in the Gulf region.


Enhanced US Partnership with the Southern Gulf States
The US is now engaged in a major effort to enhance its own military capabilities in the Gulf and those of its partner countries on the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in the realm of air power, missile defense, and air-sea operations. At the same time, the prospect of
US or Israeli preventative military action aganst Iran’s nuclear infrastructure raises the possibility of Iranian retaliation in the Gulf region. The relative balance of US, European, Arab Gulf, and Iranian military capabilities is analyzed in detail in Chapters III and IV, but several aspects are particularly important in shaping the attitudes of the leaders of the Southern Gulf states towards the US and Iran:
- Terrorism and Civil Unrest: There is a history of Iranian-linked terrorism and civil unrest dating to the infancy of the Islamic Republic. Bahrain in particular has alleged that numerous uprisings, attempted coups, and recent bombings have been linked to Iranian support for Shia factions in that country. Kuwait also has a history of dealing with Iranian-linked terrorism as early as the 1980s, with another attempted attack recently uncovered. Plots in Bahrain and Kuwait have been linked to both Hezbollah and the IRGC Quds Force.

- Support to Other Violent Non-State Actors: As has been the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia groups in Iraq, Iran has been accused of providing material support to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Arabian Peninsula. The IRGC Quds Force is accused of meeting with and providing arms to Houthi militants in Yemen, which have been battling the US-backed regimes of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
- Threat to Maritime Trade: The security of maritime commerce for much of the Arabian Peninsula is contingent upon safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The threat of Iranian mines, small boat attacks, and anti-ship missiles is a serious risk to regional commerce.

- Missile Threat: Iran’s airpower capabilities are limited by sanctions and the ageing nature of the country’s fixed-wing air force. However, Iran has compensated for these shortcomings with short to intermediate range missile capabilities that put major population centers and critical infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula in range of Iranian strikes.
- Nuclear Threat: The GCC Supreme Council meeting in December 2012 made it clear that the leaders of the Arab Gulf states supported Iran’s right to make peaceful use of nuclear power.


However, these leaders were deeply concerned about the growing evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons breakout capability and has plans to arm its missile forces with nuclear weapons.
The US has responded to these threats with a series of major security cooperation initiatives in the region geared towards containing and deterring Iran. These have included deploying US special forces and mine units to the Gulf, making the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states partners in its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar, sharply increasing the number of multilateral military exercises – especially with the US 5th Fleet, and helping the GCC states make major improvements in their deterrent and defense capabilities.
While the major Western European states and China have cut their weapons exports to the region in recent years relative to the mid-2000s, the US increased its arms agreements with GCC states by over eight times between 2004-2007 and 2008-2011. Saudi Arabia made the most drastic increases, with a nine-fold increase in 2008-2011 in versus 2004- 2007. Kuwait, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar have also experienced considerable growth in weapons imports from the US. Similar increases have also taken place in arms deliveries.

The US commitment to the security of the Arab Gulf states has steadily grown stronger, as the Iranian asymmetric and missile threats and the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons has become more threatening. There is no doubt that Washington and the Southern Gulf
states take Iranian threats seriously, and are making significant investments in building the region’s defensive capabilities.
The US has focused on helping the Southern Gulf states develop their air, naval, asymmetric warfare, and counterterrorism capabilities. It has also helped them develop improved missile defense capabilities, particularly in Qatar and the UAE.
Many GCC states are acquiring PAC-3 capabilities for the Patriot missile defense system. Unlike the PAC-2 variant, the PAC-3 can accommodate 16 missiles per launcher rather than four and offers “more advanced radar and electronics systems” as well as “‘hit to
kill’” capabilities, whereas the PAC-2 uses a “proximity fuse.”13 This system can be used “against short-range ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, and air-breathing threats.”14 Additionally, the US is selling Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)capabilities to Qatar and the UAE. THAAD, like PAC-3, also offers “hit-to-kill” capabilities, and is able to intercept ballistic missiles in the last segment of their flight, but is a wide area missile defense system. The ability of the system to intercept missiles
at high altitude – including above the Earth’s atmosphere – makes it an appealing system for the intercept of nuclear, chemical, or biological-tipped missiles.15 This system will offer additional protection to these countries and US facilities and assets within them by working synergistically with Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis systems16 already in the region.

According to Lockheed Martin, “The system [THAAD] has a track record of 100% mission success in flight testing.”

In addition to missile defense developments, the US has taken steps to enhance the air and maritime security capabilities of each friendly state to protect against threats from the air, land, and sea.
Complimenting these efforts, the US has offered Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) assistance to many of the most vulnerable states to instability in the region, such as Yemen and Bahrain, as will be discussed in
greater detail later in this report.
The Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) initiated by the Bush Administration has been sustained through the Obama Administration as Washington engages the region. There has been discussion indicating the possibility of US security guarantees or “extended
deterrence” in an effort to protect those states against Iranian threats. Such efforts could reduce the possibility that some Gulf states would acquiesce to Iranian pressure and limit the threat of proliferation in the event that Iran actually equips its force with nuclear
All of these measures represent a US commitment to the containment and deterrence of Iran in the Gulf – addressing the conventional and unconventional threats posed to these states. At the same time, the US has encouraged economic, social, and political reform; the development of energy exports; and the expansion of trade.

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Hanno, o se preferite, avrebbero lanciato una scimmia ....



Iran claims to launch into space and recover live monkey ....


Fonte .... http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/iran-claims-to-launch-into-space-and-recover-live-monkey-381554/


E non venitemi a obiettare che queste cose gli Americani le facevano più di cinquanta anni fa ....





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Ma che cosa si aspettavano ?

Che si mettessero subito sull'attenti ed esclamassero .... SIGNORSI' ... SIGNORE ? mt5lid.jpg


Sanctions Aren't Stopping Iranian Missile Proliferation ....


Despite US sanctions on Iran, the latter's pursuit of more advanced ballistic missiles and space-launch capability has not abated, said Uzi Rubin, retired Israeli air force brigadier general.

"It has not slowed down, it is accelerating," he said during a Capitol Hill address on July 19 hosted by AFA, the National Defense Industrial Association, and Reserve Officers Association.

Rubin said "lack of information" does not equate to "lack of activity" by the Iranians.

While Iran's last publicly announced ballistic missile test was in February 2011 and its last space launch test was in February 2012, there is evidence that testing continues, he said, citing the Shahab and Fateh programs.

Further, satellite images showed three unsuccessful space launch attempts later in 2012, and one in 2013, noted Rubin.

Sanctions don't work, he said, because Iran has enough resources to continue on its own and the Iranians can also bribe officials, smuggle in hardware, and purchase items on the black market.


For more on Iranian missile proliferation, see the National Air and Space Intelligence Center's 2013 report on ballistic and cruise missile threats (full document; caution, large-sized file).


—Merri Shaffer .... 7/24/2013


Fonte .... il "Daily Report" dell'AFA .... bhf5g7_th.jpg

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L’Iran ha confermato che oggi sospenderà l’arricchimento dell’uranio al 20 per cento, come stabilito dall’accordo sul nucleare raggiunto con i Paesi del gruppo dei 5+1 lo scorso 24 novembre a Ginevra. Lo ha dichiarato il portavoce dell’Agenzia atomica iraniana Behrouz Kamalvandi intervistato dall’Irna. «L’Agenzia internazionale per l’Energia Atomica e i nostri esperti sono impegnati in colloqui tecnici.



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Nuclear chief: Iran advances technology to enrich uranium

Ali Akbar Salehi says Iranian scientists 'on the threshold' of modernising production of 20 percent uranium.

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Avvertimenti ... fin troppo espliciti ...


The US military is deploying a bomber task force and the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group to US Central Command in a move the White House says puts Iran on notice.
The bombers and carrier group “send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests, or on those of our allies, will be met with unrelenting force,” National Security Advisor John Bolton said In a Sunday statement (*)
“The United States is not seeking war with the Iranian regime, but we are fully prepared to respond to any attack, whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or regular Iranian forces.”

... airforcemag.com ... White House: Bomber, Carrier Deployment to Middle East is a Message to Iran ...

(*) ... https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-bolton-2/ ...

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Aggiorniamo il Topic. 

Dopo il primo attacco verificatosi nello Stretto di Hormuz il 12 Maggio, in cui erano state prese di mira 4 petroliere di cui 2 saudite, nella giornata di ieri abbiamo assistito ad un secondo attacco a petroliere, sempre in zona (golfo di Oman). Le petroliere attaccate sono 2: La Front Altair battente bandiera delle Isole Marshall e la Kokuka Courageous battente bandiera panamense. Entrambe erano dirette in Giappone, la Altair con 75mila tonnellate di nafta mentre la Kokuka trasportava metanolo. 

L'attacco è avvenuto nelle prime ore del mattino, e subito si sono attivati i soccorsi per gli equipaggi dei 2 tanker. Dalle immagini si evince che la più danneggiata sia stata la Altair. 


A rispondere alle richieste radio di soccorso è stata la Quinta Flotta con il Destroyer DDG96 Bainbridge. Il cacciatorpediniere in questione ha rilevato anche i danni minori subiti dalla Kokuka: 



Nel frattempo che la DDG96 si recava in area operazioni, marine traffic mostrava la partenza di vascelli dalle coste iraniane,
fra cui la NAJI10  (SAR). Le imbarcazioni hanno spento i propri transponder dopo pochi minuti per poi apparire nei pressi delle navi attaccate che si trovavano separate da 14 miglia di distanza l'una dall'altra. 

Gli USA hanno prontamente accusato l'Iran, nazione che dopo l'embargo petrolifero ricordiamo aver dichiarato "se non possiamo vendere petrolio noi non lo farà nessuno". In prima analisi si era detto che le navi fossero state colpite da un torpedo, ma i danni sono apparsi da subito (almeno a me) troppo limitati per quel genere di arma contro delle petroliere cariche di roba incline a saltare in aria. O almeno nel caso della Kokuka. Nonostante alcune dichiarazioni dei marinai a bordo dei tanker parlino di "oggetti volanti ad alta velocità contro i fianchi della nave", nella giornata di oggi il CENTCOM ha rilasciato un video in cui viene ripresa una piccola imbarcazione affiancarsi alla Kokuka e armeggiare per rimuovere qualcosa. L'ipotesi più accreditata è che si tratti di mine magnetiche inesplose:

Il Video:

Per ora le risposte USA pare saranno solo sul piano economico e diplomatico. Non è esclusa la scorta a convogli, seppure, per via dell'alto numero di vascelli nell'area, l'ipotesi pare molto difficile da attuare.



Edited by fabio-22raptor

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Lo afferma l'Iran ...


Further raising tensions in the Middle East, the government of Iran claims to have shot down a Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned air vehicle (UAV) over Kuh Mubarak, a coastal area of Iran at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said on its news website that it has shot down an American spy drone that had violated Iranian airspace. 
The Islamic Republic News Agency posted a grainy picture of what appears to be a burning UAV falling out of the sky with a wing blown off (*).

... flightglobal.com ... https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/iran-claims-shoot-down-of-rq-4-global-hawk-459217/ ...

(*) ... en.irna.ir/news ... https://en.irna.ir/news/83362061/Iran-shoots-down-US-spy-drone ...

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Precisiamo che dovrebbe trattarsi di un RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 10 ceduto alla Navy per fungere da banco prova per MQ-4C Triton.

Quindi il BAMS - D ( Broad Area Maritime Surveillance - Demostrator).

Il percorso:




Edit: articolo di RID


Edited by fabio-22raptor

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Anche non fosse il modello di punta putin e xi avranno già chiamato a Teheran. (anche se sarà credo difficile essendo caduto in mare)

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Mossa precauzionale ...


The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued an emergency order prohibiting US carriers from flying in the overwater area of Iranian-controlled airspace until further notice.

... flightglobal.com ... https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/faa-prohibits-us-carriers-from-flying-over-iranian-a-459241/ ...

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Oramai tantissime fonti confermano di uno stop all'ultimo minuto da parte di trump, o meglio dei suoi consiglieri militari.  Sono abbastanza sorpreso....

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