Premetto che ho cercato e non ho trovato una vera e propria discussione sulla NATO.

 

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Simbolo dell'alleanza

 

 

Una cosa che non condivido é il fare entrare nell'alleanza stati rivali tra loro (come Grecia e Turchia) e che sono nemici di Israele, che anche se non é un membro dell'alleanza é sempre stato un alleato occidentale.

 

Questo modo di agire potrebbe portare a mettere in crisi la credibilità della NATO se questi stati assumessero posizioni differenti su questioni importanti come un'ennesima aggressione araba a Israele. Un po' come é accaduto al CSI quando la sua credibilità ha ricevuto un duro colpo nel 2008 a causa della guerra fra due suoi stati membri quali Russia e Geogia.

Franco Frattini futuro segretario generale della NATO ?

 

Fonti ....

 

http://www.difesa.it/Sala_Stampa/rassegna_stampa_online/Pagine/PdfNavigator.aspx?d=16-09-2012&pdfIndex=13

 

http://www.difesa.it/Sala_Stampa/rassegna_stampa_online/Pagine/PdfNavigator.aspx?d=16-09-2012&pdfIndex=14

RASMUSSEN RESTA AL VERTICE della Nato. Completerà il ritiro dall’Afghanistan

segnalo questa analisi (scritta dal punto di vista USA) Widening Gaps in U.S. and European Defense Capabilities and Cooperation

 

Key Points

◆◆ The United States needs Allies and partners to implement its global military strategy. We need to have Allies with capabilities as well as the political will to commit them.

◆◆ The unprecedented economic crisis across NATO will continue to affect many Allies throughout Europe until 2018 and perhaps far longer. Capabilities are being cut in deep and long lasting ways. NATO took solid steps at Chicago to counter these effects in the near term with Smart Defense and the Connected Forces Initiative.

◆◆ NATO must organize how Allies specialize as they further reduce their defense budgets. National Defense University has proposed one way to organize role specialization called Mission Focus Groups.

◆◆ Sustaining transatlantic interoperability will be the biggest challenge after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. USEUCOM should have interoperability as its primary mission. Mainstays of an interoperability strategy should be expansive U.S. engagement in the NATO Response Force and strong U.S. support for NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative.

Panetta to Convey U.S. Support at NATO Conference

 

During his fifth conference of NATO defense ministers here, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta will convey U.S. support for enhancing alliance capabilities, missile defense, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and countering weapons of mass destruction.

“I’ll also reassure allies of our strong commitment to finishing the job in Afghanistan alongside our allies,” the secretary told reporters traveling with him this week to Peru, Uruguay and Brussels.

 

Missions, Capabilities Will Top NATO Conference Agenda

Alcuni articoli della confernza NATO (a livello ministeriale)

 

Panetta Details New Realities, Command Change in Afghanistan

 

NATO Partners to Discuss Afghan Successes, Challenges

 

NATO Ministers Discuss ‘Smart Defense’ Initiative

Modificato 10 ottobre 201214 anni da Andrea75

Gli USA hanno spostato la loro attenzione sul teatro Asia-Pacifico. Una delle consegnenze è un parziale disimpegno dal teatro europeo.

Lo Strategic Studies Institute - United States Army War College presenta un paper dove invita a mantenere una adeguata presenza in Europa per poter contare su alleati affidabili (non per minaccia, ma per l'interoperabilità). Da questa pagina è possibile effettuare il download dello studio.

 

Ministers Try To Limit Impact Of Defense Cuts On NATO

 

 

E poi è stato nominato il nuovo comandate: John R. Allen direttamente dall'Afghanistan

 

Nato names US Gen John Allen as new supreme commander

 

Top military commanders would have steep challenges in new jobs

Modificato 11 ottobre 201214 anni da Andrea75

Dopo Rasmussen .... Frattini ?

 

"Frattini alla guida della Nato"

l'ex ministro candidato unico ....

 

L'Italia è "in pole" nel negoziato per il dopo Rasmussen, il cui mandato scadrà nel 2013. Anche se è possibile una proroga di un anno.

Fonte (15 settembre 2012) .... http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2012/09/15/news/frattini_alla_guida_della_nato_l_ex_ministro_candidato_unico-42572791/

 

 

Nato: Di Paola, Frattini candidato forte ....

 

'Giunto momento che alleati riconoscano ruolo Italia'

Fonte (10 Ottobre 2012) .... http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/mondo/2012/10/10/Nato-Paola-Frattini-candidato-forte_7608434.html

Dopo Rasmussen .... Frattini ?

 

Considerato che questo non è un campo dove vengono fatte elargizioni gratuite, mi viene da pensare che l'Italia vanti un "credito forte" nei confronti degli USA (anche perchè immagino che ci sia una forte concorrenza per questo incarico). Ricordo che nel 2003, prima di Rasmussen, l'offerta venne presentata all'allora Ministro della Difesa Martino Bush ha chiesto la disponibilità di Martino per la guida della Nato.

 

Mi verrebbe da pensare che l'eventuale "credito" (passatemi il termine) possa essere la partecipazione italiana alla guerra/dopo guerra/ricostruzione in Iraq. O forse c'è altro?

Mi verrebbe da pensare che l'eventuale "credito" (passatemi il termine) possa essere la partecipazione italiana alla guerra/dopo guerra/ricostruzione in Iraq. O forse c'è altro?

Potrebbe anche darsi ci sia il fatto che l'Italia, con il mandato dell'ambasciatore Manlio Brosio (1964/1971) ....

 

http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manlio_Brosio ....

 

.... ha ottenuto che le toccasse tale incarico soltanto in una occasione ....

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_Secretaries_General

 

.... e, da allora, sono ormai passati più di quarant'anni ....

NATO: Nuclear Transparency Begins At Home

 

 

Less than six months after NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) adopted at the Chicago Summit called for greater transparency of non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, the agenda for the NATO defense minister get-together in Brussels this week listed the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting with the usual constraint: “no media opportunity.”

Why should the news media not have access to the NPG meeting just like they have access to other meetings discussing NATO security issues? After all, the high stakes that justified nuclear secrecy in the past disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union, no urgent military mission is (publicly) attributed to the remaining nearly 200 U.S. nuclear bombs left in Europe, and NATO now officially advocates greater nuclear transparency.

Whatever the reason, the “no media opportunity” is symbolic of the old-fashioned secrecy that continues to constrain NATO nuclear policy discussions. The nuclear planners are insulated deep within the alliance with little or no public scrutiny. Even for NATO officials, tradition, past political statements, and turf can make it difficult to ascertain and question the rationales behind the nuclear posture.

 

US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011

 

The authors write about US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and how NATOÕs new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, places less importance on these weapons. Though the current Europe-based arsenal is only a fraction of what it was at its peak in 1971, 150”200 bombs are currently deployed in Europe and stored at six bases in five countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The authors present information on the weapons at each of these arsenals.

 

Dal report, per l'Italia:

 

Aviano US F-16 WS3 WSVs n. 18 Weapons n. 50 (Nuclear inspections in 2004, 2007, and 2009.)

Ghedi Italian Tornados WS3 WSVs n. 11 Weapons n. 10-20 (Nuclear inspections in 2004, 2007, and 2010; weapons might have been reduced.)

 

Note:

The 87 WS3 WSVs each can store up to four bombs for a total maximum of 348 weapons. Normally only one or two weapons are present. Vaults at some other bases that used to store nuclear bombs might still be maintained in a caretaker status for potential dispersal contingencies.

 

Italy hosts an estimated 60”70 B61 bombs at two locations. Approximately 50 of the weapons are thought to be stored at Aviano AB, for delivery by F-16C/Ds of the US Air Force 31st Fighter Wing.The base has 18 underground vaults for nuclear weapons storage (for a maximum capacity of 72 bombs).

Another 10”20 B61s are believed to be stored at Ghedi Torre AB, for delivery by Italian PA-200 Tornado aircraft of the 6th Fighter Wing; the weapons at Ghedi Torre AB are under custody of the US Air Force 704th MUNSS.

A decade ago, the base stored 40 bombs, but it is likely that the inventory has been reduced to match the deployment at other national bases. The Italian Tornado is expected to

begin retiring sometime after 2015, to be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a US aircraft intended to provide an affordable option to the US and allied armed forces. Italy is tentatively scheduled to receive its first four JSFs in 2014, with additional deliveries slated through 2025, for a total of 131 aircraft (Defense Department, 2010b); approximately 109 aircraft will go to the Italian Air Force. Severe budget constraints may delay or curtail ItalyÕs participation in the program.

Le basi aeree dell'Europa meridonale sono congestionate South Europe’s airbases too busy? U.S. planes on OEF rotation, NATO AWACS change route

 

With the traditional airbases in Southern Europe filled with drones, special operation aircraft and support planes possibly deployed to the Mediterranean sea in anticipation of a strike in Libya or Northern Mali, U.S. planes going to the Middle East or returning from a tour of duty in Afghanistan, have been forced to change their typical route from the CONUS and back, lately.

Between Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 18 A-10 Thunderbolt jets belonging to the 355th Fighter Wing from Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, after a stopover at Westover Air Force Base, landed at Aviano airbase, in NE Italy on their way to Afghanistan. Even if Aviano in one of the most important airbases in Europe, it’s rarely visited by airplanes deploying to the Middle East.

On Oct. 12, 13 A-10Cs belonging to the 188th Fighter Wing, AR ANG, and 175th FW, MD ANG, made a stopover at Decimomannu airbase, Sardinia, Italy, on their way back from a combat tour in Afghanistan. Whereas Aviano is the permanent base of the 31st Fighter Wing and its two F-16 Squadrons, Decimomannu does not host any American unit. Hence, the use of this airport is at least weird.

Naval Air Station Sigonella, in Sicily, is usually used for such stopovers. However, the base is not only busy with U.S. planes and helicopters deployed there in the aftermath of the Benghazi consulate attack on Sept. 11, but will soon host civil planes moved there from the close Catania Fontanarossa airport (that will be closed for works from Nov. 5 to Dec. 5, 2012).

Not only U.S. combat planes crossing the Pond are using different bases.

Quite surprisingly, on Oct. 17, local spotters saw another unusual plane arriving at Decimomannu for a temporary deployment: a NATO E-3 AWACS. Among those witnessing the arrival of the E-3A, there was also Roberto Zanda, who took the following interesting picture (and all the others you can find in this post).

Although the reason of the deployment is not clear (and might be not connected to a build-up in the Mediterranean Sea), the NATO Sentry, is an extremely rare sight in Sardinia. In fact, when they are not at the NATO Airborne Early Warning And Control Force E-3A Component’s base at Geilenkirchen, in Germany, such planes normally use one of the FOBs (Forward Operating Base) in Aktion, Greece; Trapani, Italy; and Konya, Turkey.

Panetta: Defense Alliances Key to 21st Century Security

 

 

... e Norway wishes soon to see Macedonia into NATO

 

"Macedonia is a credible partner and I hope that we shall keep developing our relations," Strom-Erichsen said. Norway will keep supporting Macedonia's defense reforms and assist in realizing projects, such as the transformation of the Regional Training Communication Center into a Partnership for Peace Training Center and the one for re-socialization the personnel leaving the army as a result of structural reform, she said.

 

“NATO remains Macedonia's strategic goal, which enjoys political consensus and public support,” Besimi said.

 

"NATO members and Norway may consider the Republic of Macedonia as a reliable partner in realizing the common goal for global peace," Besimi said.

Modificato 26 ottobre 201214 anni da Andrea75

NATO Announces 2.1B Euros of Potential C4ISR Investments

segnalo questo articolo (in tedesco) Die Berner Schlapphüte und der Nato-Schutzschirm

 

Switzerland’s intelligence service reportedly advised in its weekly report for the Swiss Federal Council to consider participating in NATO’s European missile defense system. That would obviously be quite a break from neutrality.

Europe's Defence In Times of Austerity: Spending Cuts As A One-Way Street?

Bombe nucleari USA in Europa: modernizzazione Germany and B61 Nuclear Bomb Modernization a cura di Hans M. Kristensen

 

One of the B61 bombs currently deployed in Europe is scheduled for an upgrade to extend its life and add new military capabilities and use-control features. The work has hardly begun but the project is already behind schedule and the cost has increased by more than 150 percent in two years, from $4 billion to $10.4 billion. The subcommittee wanted to know if the program is in trouble. I said I believe it certainly is.

The German television magazine FAKT did an interview (article; video) with me and it came as somewhat of a surprise to them that the B61 life-extension will not install a fire-resistant pit to improve the safety of the weapon. They also tried to get German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on the program. The policy of the German government coalition is to try to have nuclear weapons removed from Germany and Westerwelle has publicly promoted this position clearly in the past. This time he did not want to talk, however, as journalists and camera-teams chased him down the hallway. He may have gotten shell-shocked by the pushback from the old nuclear guard in NATO.

Although NATO recently determined that the current nuclear posture in Europe meets the Alliance’s deterrence and defense needs, NATO has decided – with German backing – to introduce a new precision-guided nuclear bomb in Europe with increased military capabilities at the end of the this decade for delivery by a new stealthy aircraft.

During my briefing to the foreign affairs committee I urged Germany to continue to push for a withdrawal. Otherwise it will have to explain to the German public why it has decided instead to support deployment of precision-guided nuclear bombs on stealth-delivered aircraft in Europe. The two positions will be hard to square.

 

... relazione per il parlamento tedesco Prepared Remarks to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Parliament, November 7, 2012

 

The DDPR concluded that NATO’s current nuclear posture meets the Alliance’s deterrence and defense needs. That conclusion collides with plans to improve the nuclear capabilities in NATO over the next decade and a half. B61 bombs currently deployed in Europe will be returned to the United States from 2016 and converted into a precision-­‐guided

nuclear bomb (B61-­‐12) and then returned to Europe with improved military capabilities from around 2019/2020. In addition, a new stealth fighter-­‐bomber – the F-­‐35 Joint Strike Fighter – is under construction to begin deployment to Europe in the early 2020s.

If the current posture meets the needs, why must it be improved? The B61 Life-­‐Extension Program, as it is officially called, is very expensive (currently more than $10 billion), and the high cost is partly said to be necessary to upgrade safety and security features of the bomb. It is somewhat of a mystery why that is necessary given that the weapons in Europe are always said to be safe and secure. Although new use-­‐control features will be added, at least one important safety deficiency will not be fixed: Like the current version, the B61-­‐12 will not have a fire-­‐ resistant pit (plutonium core). Fire-­‐resistant pits are installed in more modern U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent the dispersal of plutonium in a fire, but since the B61-­‐12 is reusing the warhead in the B61-­‐4, the new weapon will have the same safety flaw.

 

Modernizing NATO’s Nuclear Forces: Implications for the Alliance’s defense posture and arms control

 

Safety and security (combined known as surety) of nuclear weapons are determined by two primary factors: the design of the weapons and the storage location. Both can be undermined by the acts of unauthorized personnel, authorized personnel, and natural courses.

As forward deployed weapons, the B61 bombs in Europe have been equipped with some of the most safe and secure features in the U.S. inventory. The new B61-12 will have some improved use control features compared with the B61s in Europe, but the details are secret. What is known, however, is that the B61-12 will not be equipped with new safety features such as Fire Resistant Pit and Multi-Point Safety (see table).

Yet no safety or security system is fail-safe: accidents and incidents always happen in ways not foreseen despite the best of intensions. In 2005, I disclosed that a U.S. Air Force safety review had discovered that procedures used during maintenance of weapons created a risk that a lightning strike could trigger a nuclear detonation. In 2008, I disclosed that another U.S. Air Force review had concluded that “most” nuclear weapons storage locations in Europe did not meet U.S. security requirements and would “require significant additional resources” to bring up to standard.

Before these disclosures, NATO insisted that the nuclear weapons in Europe were safe and secure. After the disclosures, corrections were made and NATO once again insisted that the weapons were safe and secure. And now NATO has approved the expensive B61-12 program to incorporate additional security features into the forward deployed weapons. Are the weapons safe or not? Improved safety and security is always better, in principle, but given the considerable costs involved upgrades must be based on specific threats. Yet the current B61-12 upgrade appears to be based on a White House directive from 2003 that determined that warhead life extension programs must include the “incorporation of enhanced surety features independent of any threat scenario” (emphasis added). If the weapons are not safe, they should be withdrawn. This is not a technical issue: patching them up with additional features will only suffice until the next review.

...

The initial plan envisioned B61-12 first production unit (FPU) delivered in 2017. This was then delayed to 2019, and it will most likely be delayed further. Likewise, delivery of the F-35 JSF was initially scheduled for 2017, but “the Air Force now intends to deliver nuclear capability to all JSFs in Europe in the 2020 time frame via the Block IV upgrade,” according to DOD (emphasis added). For Germany and Italy, backfitting the B61-12 to the aging Tornado will require upgrades of technical capabilities and operational pro-cedures.

A German decision to add B61-12 capability to the Eurofighter would require much more extensive integration, qualify-cation and certification and be more expen-sive and time consuming. In the case of Turkey, a stopgap upgrade of the F-16 is planned to enable the aircraft to deliver the B61-12 until sufficient F-35s are operational to take over the nuclear strike mission. A stopgap upgrade is presumably also required for Dutch F-16s, and Belgian B-16s would need to be upgraded as well.

Adding B61-12 capability to five different types of aircraft in six Air Forces is excessive, complex and expensive for the type of security challenges that face NATO today. More importantly, it demonstrates that the nuclear posture is patched together by leftover pieces from an outdated posture rather than reduced, streamlined and adapted to the military and fiscal realities of today.

 

scheda dei costi della nuke B61-12: NNSA’s Gold-Plated Nuclear Bomb Project

 

At the hearing yesterday, Senator Dianne Feinstein revealed that NNSA recently told her that the $4 billion cost estimate they provided in the FY2011 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan was too low and that they would need $4 billion more to complete the program. Two months ago I reported that the cost had increased to $6 billion.

NNSA’s new cost estimate is already being challenged, this time by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office, which only a few days ago increased the estimate by another $2 billion to a whopping $10 billion.

But get this: the already too high B61 LEP cost estimate does not include other pricy elements of the B61 modernization program. In addition to the LEP itself comes a new guided tail kit assembly that the Air Force is developing to increase the accuracy of the B61. The cost estimate for that tail kit has recently increased by 50 percent from $800 million to $1.2 billion.

Add to that the cost of equipping the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter with the capability to carry the new weapons, recently estimated at around $340 million. If the LEP and tail kit increases mentioned above are any indication, however, then the cost of equipping the F-35 with nuclear capability is also likely to increase.

The escalating costs may eventually make the B61 LEP the most expensive nuclear weapons program (per warhead unit) in the U.S. arsenal. Already the projected B61 LEP cost far exceeds the cost of the W76 LEP, which probably involves three times as many warheads as will produced by the B61 LEP. As Nick Roth points out, the new $10 billion estimate is equivalent to two-thirds of what NNSA planned to spend on life extending all the other warhead types in the US arsenal over the next twenty years!

The precise number of B61-12 planned is still a secret. My take currently is around 400. If so, that would mean each B61-12 bomb would cost $28 million (including cost of tail kit).

 

 

e scheda della nuke B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes

 

 

A modified U.S. nuclear bomb currently under design will have improved military capabilities compared with older weapons and increase the targeting capability of NATO’s nuclear arsenal.

The B61-12, the product of a planned 30-year life extension and consolidation of four existing versions of the B61 into one, will be equipped with a new guidance system to increase its accuracy.

As a result, if funded by Congress, the U.S. non-strategic nuclear bombs currently deployed in five European countries will return to Europe as a life-extended version in 2018 with a significantly enhanced capability to knock out military targets.

Add to that the stealthy capability of the new F-35 aircraft being built to deliver the new weapon, and NATO is up for a significant nuclear upgrade.

The upgrade would also improve the capability of U.S. strategic bombers to destroy targets with lower yield and less radioactive fallout, a scenario that resembles the controversial PLYWD precision low-yield nuclear weapon proposal from the 1990s.

Finally, the B61-12 will mark the end of designated non-strategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, essentially making concern over “disparity” with Russian non-strategic weapons a non-issue.

The Obama administration and Congress should reject plans to increase the accuracy of nuclear weapons and instead focus on maintaining the reliability of existing weapons while reducing their role and numbers.

Modificato 14 novembre 201213 anni da Andrea75

Safety and security (combined known as surety) of nuclear weapons are determined by two primary factors: the design of the weapons and the storage location. Both can be undermined by the acts of unauthorized personnel, authorized personnel, and natural courses.

As forward deployed weapons, the B61 bombs in Europe have been equipped with some of the most safe and secure features in the U.S. inventory. The new B61-12 will have some improved use control features compared with the B61s in Europe, but the details are secret. What is known, however, is that the B61-12 will not be equipped with new safety features such as Fire Resistant Pit and Multi-Point Safety (see table).

Yet no safety or security system is fail-safe: accidents and incidents always happen in ways not foreseen despite the best of intensions. In 2005, I disclosed that a U.S. Air Force safety review had discovered that procedures used during maintenance of weapons created a risk that a lightning strike could trigger a nuclear detonation. In 2008, I disclosed that another U.S. Air Force review had concluded that “most” nuclear weapons storage locations in Europe did not meet U.S. security requirements and would “require significant additional resources” to bring up to standard.

 

Bah,

insomma costosi aggiornamenti per migliorare la precisione di impiego e la sicurezza relativa degli ordigni nucleari tattici schierati nei Paesi NATO in Europa. Si parla di migliorare la sicurezza relativa e non di raggiungere la sicurezza assoluta. La Germania che perseguiva la più chiara politica di eliminazione totale delle armi nucleari tattiche dal suo territorio sembra stia ingoiando il rospo di questo update, con l'implicazione che dovrà tenersi le bombe a Buchel ancora a lungo.

 

In Italia dove al momento sono schierati un terzo circa degli ordigni nucleari tattici NATO in Europa (50 ad Aviano e 10-20 a Ghedi) la maggior parte dell'opinione pubblica manco è informata di questo particolare.

Almeno se dobbiamo continuare a ospitare 50 ordigni ad Aviano (cosa che comunque non mi trova d'accordo), si elimini la capacità nucleare residua del 6 stormo a Ghedi, e gli Ami si aggiornino loro gli F-16 di Aviano per la B61-12.

Modificato 14 novembre 201213 anni da Scagnetti

Hispano-American Steering Committee: Agreement on AEGIS Ships in Rota

 

The Steering Committee established to amend the existing Agreement on Defense Cooperation between Spain and the United States has signed agreements for the administrative coordination of the four U.S. Aegis destroyers to be based in Rota from 2014.

Spain's participation in the NATO program for ballistic missile defense, as a dependable ally, is without financial outlay and will directly contribute to the effective protection the territory and people of Spain and the safety of the rest of Europe.

 

BIRTH OF THE AGREEMENTS

The development of the Protocol and of the administrative arrangements for its implementation was entrusted to a Steering Committee, chaired by Vice Admiral Horcada Ignacio Rubio, Assistant Director General of Planning and International Relations of the Ministry of Defense, and Admiral Montgomery, representing the Planning Section of the U.S. European Command.

The four working groups formed under the Steering Committee, specializing in the areas of infrastructure, training and operations, maintenance, and technology transfer documents, have developed a framework for coordinating the actions leading to the deployment of the four ships.

With the signing of these agreements, on Nov. 13, the Steering Committee has completed this phase, which will allow the necessary preparatory work until the arrival of Rota's first American destroyers in 2014.

The Hispanic-American Standing Committee will continue to ensure the proper implementation and enforcement of the Convention of Defense Cooperation with the United States and its derivative documents, overseeing the preparation work referred to above and ensuring that that it is implemented as required.

 

BACKGROUND

In order to contribute significantly to NATO’s ballistic missile defense system, the Spanish Council of Ministers on October 7, 2011 authorized the deployment of four U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in the naval base of Rota, as well as the necessary facilities that allow the permanent stationing of ships and their crews in the base.

On 10 October, Spanish Minister of Defence Peter Morenés and the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Leon E. Panetta, signed the 2nd Protocol to amend the existing Agreement on Defense Cooperation between Spain and the United States, which formalizes the authorization and the terms of the deployment of these ships.

su A&D di questo mese (novembre 2012) si paventa l'ipotesi di un ingresso di Svezia e Finlandia in ambito NATO, con relative paranoie di Putin: inoltre viene dato risalto ai recenti acquisti (AGM targati USA) fatti dal governo di Helsinki e che i finlandesi possiedono la "migliore" artiglieria sul suolo europeo

migliore non direi proprio. forse la più numerosa.

e seguendo quale dottrina militare possiedono cotanta artiglieria????

questa notizia è già stata postata nel topic sulla "Turchia" però interessa anche questa discussione Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Patriot Missile Deployment to Turkey

 

I have received a letter from the Turkish government requesting the deployment of Patriot missiles. Such a deployment would augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities to defend the population and territory of Turkey. It would contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along NATO’s south-eastern border. And it would be a concrete demonstration of Alliance solidarity and resolve.

 

In its letter, the Turkish government stressed that the deployment will be defensive only, and that it will in no way support a no-fly zone or any offensive operation.

 

NATO will discuss Turkey’s request without delay. If approved, the deployment would be undertaken in accordance with NATO’s standing air defence plan. It is up to the individual NATO countries that have available Patriots - Germany, the Netherlands and the United States - to decide if they can provide them for deployment in Turkey and for how long. Next week a joint team will visit Turkey to conduct a site-survey for the possible deployment of Patriots.

 

The security of the Alliance is indivisible. NATO is fully committed to deterring against any threats and defending Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Dal "Daily Report" dell'AFA di questa mattina ....

 

 

Leaders for NATO's Next Air Campaign ....

 

 

F-16s crews from the 480th Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem AB, Germany, flew to Albacete, Spain, for NATO's month-long Tactical Leadership Program.

 

Working with aircrews from Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, the Spangdahlem airmen are training through Nov. 30 to plan and execute integrated coalition air campaigns.

 

"We are able to integrate the pros and cons of each asset now so we can push forward as one unit, which is much more effective than 10 to 15 nations acting separately," explained Lt. Col. Douglas Sirk, Warrior Prep Center Detachment 1 commander, in Spangdahlem's Nov. 19 release.

 

Over the course of 16 missions, the crews are learning to communicate and merge the capabilities of different aircraft and country-specific quirks through standardized procedures.

 

"They're basically the same, but the terminology is different; the pace of battle is a little different" between countries, said 480th FS pilot Capt. David Dubel.

 

The exercise began on Nov. 5.

 

Albacete report by SSgt. Daryl Knee .... http://www.usafe.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123326915

 

 

An Italian air force Tornado jet fighter and bomber taxis onto the flightline after participating in an air mission of the Tactical Leadership Program Nov. 14, 2012.

The TLP is a NATO-based training exercise that develops leadership skills, enhances tactical air operation abilities, and reaffirms conceptual and doctrinal initiatives of seven participating nations: France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Daryl Knee)

Il "TLP" .... https://www.tlp-info.org/home/

 

Definizione del "TLP" .... dal sito dell'Aeronautica Militare ....

 

T.L.P. - TACTICAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMME

 

Programma addestrativo NATO che mira a fare dei giovani piloti dei 'package leader', consentendo loro di comandare formazioni 'pesanti' di velivoli da combattimento.

La gestione dei corsi, con sede a Albacete (Spagna), è affidata attualmente alle forze aeree di dieci nazioni (Belgio, Danimarca, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Gran Bretagna, Italia, Olanda, Spagna e Stati Uniti d'America) che hanno sottoscritto il memorandum d’intesa (MoU).

L’Aeronautica Militare ha aderito al TLP come nazione firmataria nel gennaio 1996.

Obiettivi: accrescere e standardizzare l’addestramento degli equipaggi mediante lo sviluppo della capacità di comando tattico, della pianificazione di missioni complesse e della capacità di assegnazione dei compiti.

 

Precedenti partecipazioni al "TLP" dell'Aeronautica Militare nel 2012 ....

 

http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Conclusoflyingcourse20123pressoTLPdiAlbacete_080612.aspx

 

http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/TLPconclusoadAlbaceteilFlyingCourse_091012.aspx

Modificato 26 novembre 201213 anni da TT-1 Pinto

... trasloco NATO moving its Naples-based southern command to high-tech campus

 

NATO said Monday it is moving its run-down southern command in Italy to a new €164-million ($212 million) high-tech campus 20 kilometers (10 miles) away.

The alliance said it would leave its base of nearly 60 years, located in the Naples neighborhood of Bagnoli, on Dec. 3 and move to the new campus at Lake Patria, in farmland up the coast.The new base will help give NATO greater operational flexibility, said U.S. Navy Capt. Ike Skelton, spokesman for the Joint Force Command. The base coordinated NATO action in the Balkans, and more recently in Libya.

NATO is looking to reform and streamline its command structure, still partially based on Cold War requirements, in response to declining defense budgets in most member nations. This is in keeping with NATO’s new philosophy of “smart defense,” allowing members to combine resources and reduce duplication.

Plans for the move began some 25 years ago, yet Italian promises for a new highway and rail link to the new site haven’t yet materialized. Italy provided the land for the new campus and NATO funds covered construction costs, Skelton said.

There’s no housing at the base; NATO and the base’s civilian staff will live off-site as they do at Bagnoli. Plans for an international school for children of base staff were scrapped because of budget constraints, according to the Joint Force Command website.

Lo scorso 13 Novembre si è tenuta una conferenza dal titolo “Nuclear modernization”: What does it mean and what is required for U.S. security?, organizzata dal British American Security Information Council (BASIC).

 

Nel corso della riunione è stato presentato questo discorso Remarks of Nuclear Modernization da parte di Hans M. Kristensen

 

Putting an end to Cold War thinking will require a great deal more. We’re now at a crossroad where decisions will have to be made about the next generation of key components of the nuclear posture. Decisions we make now will cost enormous sums, lock us into a force structure for half a century, and influence how adversaries and allies adjust their postures and attitudes for the next decades. The basis for these force structure decisions tie in with the White House nuclear targeting review that is nearing completion.

The decisions and scope are not known but the review is intended to identify new reductions that can be pursued with Russia and possibly others. This includes adjustments in targeting requirements and alert levels, including whether it is still necessary for the military to plan against a Russian surprise nuclear attack – a scenario the Intelligence Community has already concluded will most likely not occur.

 

Force Structure

The force structure analysis conducted in preparation for the New START treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review protected the existing force structure and was based on presidential guidance that had been in place for some time. This force structure is bloated and will increasingly be out of sync with Russia’s nuclear forces structure, which is already declining below the New START Treaty limit. The U.S. must adjust its force structure to demonstrate that it intends to follow Russia and avoid that the large U.S. force structure and warhead upload capability deepen mistrust and drive Russian worst-­‐case planning.

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Nuclear Warheads

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Nuclear Infrastructure

 

 

A seguire le indicazioni del Preseidente Obama a riguardo (del 2011) Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama's Words Into Action

 

The current U.S. nuclear arsenal and the force structure planned under New START are far larger than required to deter a nuclear attack from Russia or any other nuclear-armed adversary on the United States and its allies. The oversized arsenal reflects the fact that U.S. military planners base targeting calculations on Cold War assumptions, including that U.S. forces must be able to destroy enemy nuclear forces and a wide range of other "strategic" assets in order to be credible. Consequently, previous nuclear policy reviews have only trimmed U.S. nuclear forces.

The guidance review should result in a smaller set of new strike options based on what is sufficient to deter the United States' potential nuclear-armed adversaries from initiating a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, or its partners. The strike options should be based on a new approach to nuclear planning that significantly scales back the number and types of targets, the damage expectancy, the counterforce focus and force-on-force planning, and the operational readiness of the forces. This approach would significantly reduce the number of targets and missions and facilitate further reductions in the number of nuclear warheads and delivery platforms, while maintaining a secure and sufficiently credible nuclear deterrent.

Such steps would make the U.S. nuclear posture more consistent with the Obama administration's policy of significantly reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons and strengthening nonproliferation. An added benefit would be to facilitate significant budgetary savings in the years ahead by reducing the costs associated with current, multibillion-dollar plans to modernize not only each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, but also nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, nuclear warheads, and the nuclear production complex. Such reductions will, in turn, also help convince Russia that it is in its security and financial interests to pursue further, parallel reductions in its equally bloated nuclear forces.

 

... ed i relativi pianni di guerra Obama and the Nuclear War Plan Obama and the Nuclear War Plan

 

The current U.S. strategic war plan is directed against six adversaries. Guess who.