L'US Army ai tempi dei tagli di bilancio

[Guest intruder]

U.S. Army Ground Vehicles Up and Down

 

By Paul McLeary aviationweek.com

 

 

 

The U.S. Army is requesting a fiscal 2010 base budget of $142 billion — $2 billion more than the service’s FY ’09 request — even though there are some big cuts on the ground vehicle side of the ledger.

 

The biggest cut, of course, comes in the form of the eight variants of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Manned Ground Vehicle fleet that Defense Secretary Robert Gates has already revealed would be dropped (Aerospace DAILY, April 7).

 

Requests for spending on weapons and combat vehicles come in lower than last year, falling from FY ’09’s $3.7 billion to $2.5 billion in FY ’10, with the combat vehicle slice of that pie dropping to $716 million from $1.1 billion in FY ’09.

 

While the Army is requesting enough funding to produce 1,080 M-ATVs, there is no funding for the acquisition of new eight-wheeled Stryker vehicles, even though $389 million is being requested for modification and enhancement of the existing fleet, which will keep the “lines warm” if there is a need for further Stryker buys in the future, according to Army briefer Lt. Gen. Edgar Stanton, who spoke at the Pentagon May 7.

 

Spending on FCS spinouts will actually increase under the Army’s plan, rising from $67 million in FY ’09 to $328 million in FY ’10. This makes sense when one considers that the Army plans to accelerate FCS spinouts to all Brigade Combat Teams, a process that Stanton estimated will take until FY ’25.

 

Part of that spinout includes Tactical Ground Sensors, which are funded in the new Army budget, and had already been included in the long-planned FCS Spinout 1. Another segment of Spinout 1 is the Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) system, which is part of the ill-starred FCS Manned Ground Vehicle program.

 

While the MGV’s are on the chopping block, Stanton said that the Army’s budget calls for halting development of the NLOS-C, though there is still money in the budget for both the gun and its platform. When asked, Stanton admitted that the Army doesn’t know what it is going to do with the program.

 

He also said the Army is “looking at the requirements for a new manned ground vehicle” now that the FCS manned component is likely to be cut, adding that by Labor Day the service will “try and come up with a concepts requirement” for how to move forward.

 

Stanton said that the Army is going to “start with a blank sheet of paper” when developing a new ground vehicle strategy.

[Guest intruder]

The Future Sneaks Up On You

May 13, 2009: The U.S. Army is caught in the middle of a debate over its future. Many politicians want to turn the army into a force specializing in irregular warfare (as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan). Many generals, and some politicians, warn that the army is still needed for conventional warfare, against a foe with lots of armor, aircraft and trained troops. While the army still contains many armored unit (about half the 45 brigades are equipped with tanks and other armored vehicles), many of the tank crews have gone to Iraq and served as infantry. In the last five years, very little mechanized warfare training has been done. The troops train for Iraq and Afghanistan, which means infantry fighting.

But there has been another development, which is largely overlooked. And that is the fact that the army and marines have been able to upgrade their fighting capabilities considerably in the course of fighting this irregular war. That has produced American ground forces that are combat experienced, and equipped with new, and combat proven, technology. This would be a powerful weapon in any kind of war.

 

This happened because of all the money that has been spent to support the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The war on terror has cost over a trillion dollars so far. Over 90 percent of that has gone to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the costs go to construction, transportation and hiring of civilian contractors (mainly for support jobs, but also for security work.) Putting reservists on full time duty status has also been expensive, but not as much as the higher paid civilians.

 

About fifteen percent of the money goes to buying and repairing equipment and weapons. The war effort is building lots of spiffy new bases, but it is also enabling the army and marines to upgrade their weapons and equipment, while, at the same time, making sure that new stuff works in combat. The army and marines are quite happy with this, but keeping quiet about how they are, in the process, obtaining new stuff they didn't expect to see for another decade. Compared to past wars, not a lot of ammunition has been used, and this accounts for less than one percent of all costs.

 

Meanwhile, a decade ago, the U.S. Army came up with an ambitious, and expensive, plan to replace much of its Cold War era weapons and gear with a new generation of stuff. This is what the Department of Defense has decided to cut back on. The replacement program was called FCS (Future Combat Systems). FCS got a lot of media attention because it promised to incorporate all sorts of neat new technology, and cost over a hundred billion dollars. While that sounds like a lot, it’s not when you consider that the current Cold War era heavy weapons (armored vehicles, artillery) and other equipment (radios, and all sorts of electronics) are wearing out and will have to be replaced, even if the FCS project didn’t exist. Four thousand new tanks, at a cost of $5 million each (current cost of an M1) is $20 billion. But new generations of gear rarely cost the same as the stuff they replace. So you can see how FCS grew into a hundred billion dollar baby.

 

While commentators, and critics, tend to concentrate on the ambitious proposals for new tanks and other armored vehicles, the true heart of FCS can be seen in every home and workplace in America. What the army wants is a battlefield Internet, with everyone from the individual infantryman, to the highest ranking general, tied into the same, real time, network. Moreover, the biggest problems with all of this are not hardware, but software. This battlefield network has to achieve a new level of reliability, because in combat, a system crash can be fatal to the user. The army is even building its own operating system (SOSCOE, short for “System of Systems Common Operating Environment”), in an effort to obtain an operating system less lethal (to its users) than Microsoft Windows, and more reliable than Linux. Already, the software for the new digital radios is causing headaches, as is development of SOSCOE. This is where the real struggle to make FCS work will take place. But with a networked force, the army will be far more lethal, and far less likely to take casualties. This is already being proven in Iraq and Afghanistan, where prototype versions of FCS are in action. The new equipment troops have received for Iraq and Afghanistan operations have, in effect, created the battlefield Internet. Not on purpose, just in the course of giving the troops new gear that will help them win and survive. This has worked, as U.S. troops have fought over the last eight years and suffered a casualty rate a third of what was experienced in Vietnam and World War II. This is unprecedented, and much marveled at by foreign military experts. The U.S. ground forces have become the most effective in history. The U.S. media has not picked up on this, but Chinese and Russian generals and military planners have.

 

There are some other new wrinkles in FCS. Aside from a new tank, infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and self-propelled artillery (which, again, will be needed in the next decade or two anyway), there will be some new vehicle types. For example, the old command and control vehicles, which were customized IFVs with more radios and gadgets, will be even more customized, and available down to the company level (previously, battalion level.) In addition to a new armored ambulance (like the current one, based on an IFV, but without a turret), there will be a similar medical vehicle equipped for more extensive treatment of the wounded. Speed saves lives when it comes to treating the wounded. The battlefield Internet would allow the doctor in the treatment ambulance to get expert advice from other surgeons anywhere on the planet. Capabilities like this have already evolved in Iraq and Afghanistan. The army doesn't call this FCS, but, for all practical purposes, it is.

 

Another new FCS armored vehicle (based on a rather more limited one used now) will be reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition armored vehicles, which will use the growing number of air and ground based sensors to find the enemy and immediately pass the information on to commanders and artillery and bombers.

 

Another growing FCS category will be robots. Not only more UAVs and ground robots, but also “mules” (small, low slung, cargo carrying, golf cart like), which will have sensors and software that enable them to find their own way on the battlefield and, well, do the heavy lifting. Another battlefield robot will be autonomous mines that launch missiles, instead of top-attack anti-tank weapons (like the WAAM has been doing for over a decade). The new “Intelligent Munitions Systems” will be tied into a network and act as sensors as well as weapons. Combat robots are a major part of FCS that no one wants to talk about. Probably because combat robots are really, really scary, and the army doesn’t want to take a lot of heat for the battle droids before it can show them succeeding in combat. That has already happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. The individual infantryman is already getting new weapons, commo gear, sensors and "wearable computers." FCS is also about radical changes for the way all troops operate. But it's already happened.

 

So, when you see any coverage of FCS, remember that the really important stuff is networking, software and combat robots. And don't forget that the army is taking advantage of all the fighting it is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan to implement FCS. The fighting causes equipment and weapons to be destroyed or worn out at a high rate. The replacement gear is often FCS class stuff. The army is also testing a lot of the FCS ideas in combat. This is nothing new, as wartime always creates a call for new ideas and equipment. The army had actually tested many of the basic FCS commo ideas before September 11, 2001, or the Iraq invasion, so using that gear in combat (like Blue Force Tracker and all the UAVs) simply allows the troops to perfect the ideas and hardware. Thus FCS is more than the hundred billion dollar procurement contracts that Congress concentrates on. FCS is slowly evolving within the army right now, even as the official budget for these innovative systems is cut.

 

 

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htarm/art...s/20090513.aspx

[Guest intruder]

U.S. Army Continues to Face Pressure on FCS

 

 

By Bettina H. Chavanne and Michael Bruno

Washington

www.aviationweek.com

 

 

 

 

With cancellation of the Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) component of the U.S. Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) and potential reworking of the whole effort, the service is nonetheless still being challenged to answer questions regarding cost overruns.

 

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has criticized the FCS contract structure, let by Boeing and SAIC, and moved to strike the MGV portion with indications of future competitions. But while the Army tries to recraft FCS, scrutiny in Washington seems to indicate stricter contracting expectations, regardless the new program (Aerospace DAILY, May 13).

 

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing May 19 with Army Secretary Pete Geren and Gen. George Casey, Army chief of staff, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) noted FCS hit a 45-percent cost overrun before the first piece of equipment was even delivered.

 

“If we keep generating changes that result in cost overruns, it’s either bad planning or bad program management,” said McCain, the panel’s ranking Republican.

 

Casey attributed the increases to the Army’s added requirements, but said some of that could be “adapting to the current fight.” Indeed, regarding Gates’ moves, Casey offered a dissenting opinion over accommodating lessons learned from post-9/11 operations into FCS, but the Army’s top general did not directly challenge the defense secretary’s recommendation. “I support it, I did not agree with it,” the chief said.

 

Some news reports in recent days have declared FCS dead as Army officials have increasingly discussed efforts to re-approach it, including one effort called the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization. However, Casey stressed to the SASC that while the program would be restructured and even expanded to more units, the rest of the FCS effort would continue, including a revised ground vehicle element. Both Geren and Casey also reminded senators that Gates and the Pentagon’s new acquisition chief have voiced commitments to the Army’s modernization in future budgets.

 

Meanwhile, Oklahoma Sen. James Inhofe’s continued his defense of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) under FCS. A new battlefield artillery system to the 1960’s-era Paladin has been studied for years. “The time for studies is over,” Inhofe said. “We have to get into a new system.”

 

Inhofe, the ranking minority member behind McCain, further noted standing law he helped enact that requires the Army to produce an NLOS-C “indirect fire capability to equip the future force.” Should the NLOS-C be canceled, a change in legislation would be required (Aerospace DAILY, April 2). “What will happen if we don’t change the law?” Inhofe asked Casey.

 

“We’re working with DOD...to figure out a way through this,” Casey responded.

 

The NLOS-C was to be assembled at a BAE Systems facility in Elgin, Okla. Inhofe asserted there was “nothing parochial” about his concerns, and he has lambasted President Barack Obama’s overall defense budget as “disarming America.”

[Guest intruder]

Future Combat Systems Officially Terminated

 

Jun 23, 2009

 

 

 

Paul McLeary

www.aviationweek.com

 

 

The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) has officially been canceled, according to an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) released June 23 by the Defense Department's Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter.

 

The Army's troubled, $160 billion-plus modernization program -- led by Boeing and SAIC -- had long been in the sights of critics, and this year their numbers included Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who announced in April the termination of the program's major Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) component.

 

Army modernization is now being rebranded as the Brigade Combat Team Modernization Strategy, with elements of FCS sensor, unmanned aircraft and communication technologies envisioned as being spread across the whole land force (Aerospace DAILY, June 12).

 

Technologies pegged to survive in some form include BAE Systems' Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C), which since 2006 has had its own funding stream but depends on the MGV program for its platform. In the ADM, Carter explicitly said that work be stopped on the NLOS-C, "and that the Army take the necessary contractual actions to implement this decision."

 

The Army is being given 30 days to come up with a plan and brief Carter on where the armed service wants to go. It is also given until July to "brief key stakeholders...on the results of the FCS System of Systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to facilitate understanding of the FCS program designs and investment to date in sensors, the network and vehicles."

 

In place of FCS as a whole, the new plan is to consist of "a number of integrated acquisition programs: one to produce and field the first seven SpinOut Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (SO E-IBCT) unit sets; one or more Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) to include, but not limited to, MDAPs for follow-on BCT modernization to develop, produce and field required unmanned systems, sensors and networking for the remaining combat brigades; one MDAP to continue development and fielding of incremental ground tactical network capability; and one MDAP to develop ground combat vehicles," according to the memo.