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U.S. Intelligence, Contradicting Ankara, Indicates Aircraft Was Shot Down by Syria in Its Own Airspace, Officials Say



Damascus has said it shot down the plane with an antiaircraft battery with an effective range of about 1.5 miles.

"We see no indication that it was shot down by a surface-to-air missile" as Turkey says, said a senior defense official. Officials declined to specify the sources of their information.


A former senior U.S. official who worked closely with Turkey said he believed the flight's course was meant to test Syria's response. "You think that the airplane was there by mistake?" the former official said.

"These countries are all testing how fast they get picked up and how fast someone responds," said a senior U.S. official. "It's part of training."



“Turkish F-4 gunned down by anti-aircraft artillery inside the Syrian airspace” U.S. intelligence says


Turkey Scrambles F-16s On Syria Border As US Intelligence Says Syrian Story Was Correct All Along

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F-4 Phantom abbattuto: c'è chi propone una teoria alternativa Turkish F-4 Phantom shot down by Syria actually a drone?


Phantom downed in mysterious circumstances by a Syrian anti-aircraft artillery off Latakia, was actually a remotely controlled aircraft (a drone), being used to either spying on Assad’s regime activities in northern Syria, or probing Damascus air defenses, as suggested by a NATO pilot and reportedly routinely done in the Aegean with the Greek ones.


According to some sources, with some U.S. help (Americans play a role in almost all conspiracy theories…) TAI could have modified some of its Phantoms to perform unmanned, dangerous spying missions, in which a much faster type of aircraft, offering a higher sensors payload, is needed.

However, it’s just an intriguing theory that was probably fueled by the mysterious flight path of the plane ...


Mah! Tutto è possibile, però perchè modificare un aereo adattandolo a drone invece di usare un drone vero e proprio?





In the meanwhile, the Ankara has released new and even more detailed data about the downed plane [that used radio callsign "Safak 46"] on Jul. 1 in response to the WSJ article that quoted U.S. intelligence sources that backed the Syrian account of the incident.


Here’s a rough translation of the Turkish General Staff statement:


1. The statement is needed to answer the claims based on the story published by foreign press organs about the downing of the aircraft by Syria in international airspace on Jun. 22, 2012.

2. As already stated several times before, the aircraft was shot down in international airspace while flying as a single plane, an unarmed flight mission to test existing radar installations in the region.

3. According with our radar data, and as a result of our investigations: the aircraft took off from Erhac / Malatya at 1030, vectored towards Eastern Mediterranean, approached waypoint #1 at 11:06 local time started to cruise at an altitude of 21,400ft. The aircraft approached waypoint #2 at 11:14 at 8,600ft, waypoint #3 at 11:23 at 7,500ft, waypoint #4 at 11:37 at 2,000ft and return leg for a second test run at 11:50 at 3,000ft. Violation of Syrian airspace lasted about 5 minutes. According to the analysis of radar track and radio comms during the second leg approaching waypoint #4 the aircraft suddenly lost altitude at 7,400 feet altitude at 11:56 and contact was lost at 11:57, in international airspace.

4. Immediately after, a search and rescue mission started and a public statement has been made.

5. Subsequently it was learned that our aircraft was brought down by Syria.

6. As a result, based on the research, analyisis of the radar track history and investigation, the aircraft was hit approximately 13 miles off Syrian airspace, and the last point that the aircraft was flying stable was 35 48.22 North, 33.21 East 35th. From this point the aircraft quickly lost speed and altitude and Syria crashed in Syrian territorial waters 8.5 miles off the coast approximately at 35 48.26 North, 37.59 East.

7. There is no information about the fate of our pilots.

8. The Nautilus ship, used to recover the wreckage of the aircraft is expected to arrive in the area by the evening of Monday Jul. 2.

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Siria: immagine di un bambino soldato


L'esercito di Assad tiene ma con molte crepe


punti deboli:

1) Gli ufficiali mostrano scarsa inventiva, ingessati dal rispetto di ordini brutali e poco inclini a cambiare.

2) I mezzi blindati, quando operano nei centri abitati, raramente sono accompagnati dalla fanteria, fondamentale per contrastare gli agguati dei ribelli dotati di armi contro-carro.

3) Gli elicotteri si mantengono quasi sempre a quote alte per il timore di essere colpiti.

4) I bombardamenti pesanti devastano le città ma non eliminano gli insorti.

5) I mezzi sostano agli incroci o vicini alle basi senza un’adeguata protezione e diventano bersagli facili.

6) Non tutti i reparti sembrano addestrati al combattimento urbani. E non hanno neppure veicoli adeguati.

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una domanda tecnica di diritto internazionale: se si accerta che l'abbattimento è stato un "errore" (come detto per motivi politici e rabbonire i turchi dai siriani, anche l'aereo turco ha effettivamente violato lo spazio aereo) e lo stato offre scuse ufficiali, poi deve anche pagare il costo dell'aereo e magari un risarcimento per la perdita dei piloti (addestrati con corsi lunghi e costosi) allo stato e alle loro famiglie?

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dipende dagli accordi tra gli stati , in punta di diritto però l abbattimento del caccia turco è esercizio del attività sovrana del governo siriano e quindi fuori da qualsiasi giurisdizione salvo diverse regoli interne siriane

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Assad perde un sostegno importante Syrian’s Defection Signals Eroding Support for Assad


the defector, Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass ... has provided the most telling sign yet of eroding support for his government among even the most elite and trusted Sunni Muslims, who serve as a critical pillar of the security forces and civilian administration.


ed un'analisi che, sulla stessa lunghezza d'onda, indica che il regime stà perdendo consenso anche tra l'elite


Considering a Sunni Regime in Syria


Last week's publicized defection of the Tlass family marked a potential turning point for Syria's al Assad regime.

The Tlass family formed the main pillar of Sunni support for the minority Alawite regime. The patriarch of the family, former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, had a strategic, brotherly bond with late Syrian President Hafez al Assad.


poi l'analisi prosegue ipotizzando una presa di potere da parte della maggioranza di confessione sunnita


With U.S. backing, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar have banded together to lead a countercoalition to Iran. Iraq may have been reluctantly conceded to Iran, but the uprising in Syria offered a new opportunity to undercut Iran's Mediterranean outlet in the Levant. Saudi Arabia has been trying to manage simmering Shiite unrest on the Arabian Peninsula, while Turkey is looking to lay a Sunni foundation for its regional resurgence. As a result, increased amounts of money, supplies, weaponry, training and intelligence support have made their way to the Syrian rebels through covert channels. The hope was that a covert campaign would obviate the need for a costly foreign military intervention and lead to the collapse of the regime from within. In theory, the plan sounds reasonable. In practice, it's a lot more complicated.
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Novità A technical failure may have caused the crash of the Turkish RF-4E in Syria


According to the report by the Presidency of the Gendarmerie Criminal Department, the remains of the aircraft collected on the water surface did not provide evidence of any organic or inorganic explosive residues, any fire initiator or accelerator substances which are derivatives of petroleum, and there is no sign of an ammunition remnant.

To make it simple: it was neither a missile nor gun fire. Therefore, it could have been a technical malfunction or a sudden emergency that did not give the crew the time to radio the alert.

But it is quite unlikely. After experiencing the failure, the pilot headed towards Syria. A decision that proves that the two on board had the time to react to situation, no matter which one it was.

Also a bit confusing are the claims by Ankara.

On Jun. 22, Turkey said that one of their planes had been gunned down by Syrian armed forces even though they later claimed it was hit by a SAM missile. Today the latest Turkish official release states that “the plane which was gunned down by the Syrian armed forces, according to the Syrian official authorities” [highlight mine].

The saga continues.


Mentre sul fornte politico Syria's ambassador to Iraq defects in major blow to regime

Edited by Andrea75
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Per carità, è più che giusto che le decisioni sulla Siria ,anche per salvare gli sfortunati abitanti che vorrebbero continuare a vivere, siano prese da chi ha le conoscenze globali per farlo, però una soluzione che salva "capra e cavoli" potrebbe essere la resignazione dell'allampanato Assad junior (che non sembra nè etico, nè autorevole) ,però sostituito da una personalità,magari transitoria, che manterrebbe lo stesso orientamento in politica estera.

Se non ricordo male nei primi anni '70 la Spagna si trovava in una situazione molto simile a quella siriana attuale, con i Franchisti impegnati in sparatorie contro i filo-comunisti e l'economia che peggiorava ogni giorno di più, per fortuna lo stesso Franco (persona complessa di cui forse si è scritto troppo poco) decise di ricostituire la Monarchia e di accettare come successore il giovane Juan Carlos, onestamente diversissimo come idee politiche ed opinioni religiose. La Spagna da un ato cessò di essere Franchista ,dall'altro rimase legata all'Occidente ed anzi sarebbe poi entrata a tutti gli effetti nella NATO come membro importante

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Siria, sparatorie nel centro di Damasco


Violenti scontri a fuoco tra le milizie fedeli al regime di Bashar al-Assad e gli uomini dell'Esercito siriano libero sono in corso nel centro di Damasco.

I Comitati locali di


Syria: Assad regime 'ready to use chemical weapons'


The most senior Syrian politician to defect to the opposition has told the BBC the regime will not hesitate to use chemical weapons if it is cornered.

Nawaf Fares, ex-ambassador to Iraq, said unconfirmed reports indicated such weapons might have already been used.

The comments were made as clashes were reported in Baghdad Street, central Damascus, and fighting spread in suburbs around the city.

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Damasco, bomba nel palazzo del potere: ucciso ministro della Difesa e cognato di Assad


Il ministro siriano della Difesa, Dawoud Rajiha, e il suo vice Assef Shawkat (cognato di Assad) sono morti nell'attentato contro il quartier generale della sicurezza a Damasco dove era in corso un vertice tra il governo Assad e i capi dell'intelligence. Non è ancora chiaro se si sia trattato di un attacco kamikaze o di una bomba lasciata nel palazzo probabilmente da un infiltrato. Nell'esplosione sarebbero rimasto ferito anche il capo dell'intelligence, Hisham Bekhtyar, che è stato sottoposto ad un'operazione chirurgica. Feriti «in maniera critica» anche alti funzionari della sicurezza. Secondo la tv di Hezbollah, Al Manar, sarebbe morte anche il ministro dell'Interno, Mohamed Ibrahim Al Shaar. Ma la tv di stato smentisce: il ministro dell'Interno, Mohamed Al Shaar, è vivo, in «condizioni stabili».

Il Libero esercito siriano (la milizia dei ribelli anti-Assad) ha rivendicato l'attentato. «Questo è il vulcano di cui abbiamo parlato, abbiamo appena iniziato», ha avvertito il portavoce Qassim Saadedine. «Il Vulcano di Damasco e il terremoto della Siria» è il nome dell'operazione lanciata lunedì dai ribelli contro le forze del presidente Bashar al-Assad. Anche un gruppo islamista di opposizione al regime siriano, Liwa al-Islam, ha rivendicato su Facebook la responsabilità dell'attentato.


Syria crisis: Assad's brother-in-law killed, says state TV


Al-Jazeera is reporting two claims of responsibility for the attack on Assad's inner circle: from the Free Syrian Army and also a group called the Islamic Brigade.

Hezbollah's TV station now says four top officials were killed: defence minister Dawoud Rajha, Assad's brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, interior minister Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaar, and the head of the national security office.

Syrian TV has confirmed the deaths of Rajha and Shawkat.

Al-Jazeera also says the explosion in the meeting room was followed by gunfire.


Appena morto e già sostituito Syria appoints new defence minister


Syria appointed General Fahad Jassim al-Freij as defence minister, state television said, to replace Daoud Rajha who was killed in a bomb attack on Wednesday.


Diserzioni 2 Syrian brigadier generals cross into Turkey: official


Two Syrian brigadier generals crossed into Turkey overnight, a Turkish foreign ministry official told AFP Wednesday.

"Some 330 Syrians including two brigadier generals fled to Turkey Tuesday night," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.



La crisi si fà, di giorno in giorno, più cruenta. Provo ad ipotizzare alcuni scenari:


Scenario 1

Ci sono state defezioni e salti della barricata da parte di numerosi e importanti settori dell'appartato di difesa e di sicurezza del regime. Questo ha riequilibrato le forze sul campo, ed ha permesso ai ribelli di arrivare a colpire Damasco.


Scenario 2

Si è formata una colaizione internazionale (in modo discreto) tra paesi dell'Occidente, Turchia, e paesi del Golfo (Arabia Saudia in testa) con lo scopo di arrivare ad un cambio di regime, sia per spodestare Assad, sia in funzione anti Iran.


Scenario 3

Potrebbero essersi infiltrati elementi quadeisti, che intravedono la possibilità di modellare un nuovo stato secondo le loro idee, oppure anche solo per mettere le mani sulle armi (preferibilmente quelle chimiche) del regime.


Cosa può succedere? Provo a proseguire con altre ipotesi:


Reazione 1

Assad incattivisce ulteriormente la repressione, grazie ad aiuti da Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, o magari usando l'arsenale chimico.


Reazione 2

La Russia agevola l'uscita di scena di Assad in cambio di una qualche garanzia (continuare a poter esercitare un influenza su quello Stato)


Reazione 3

La NATO (USA) interviene, l'Arabia Saudita paga il conto, e si prova a replicare quanto e successo con l'operazione Desert Sortm del 1991


Reazione 4

La comunità interazionale non interviene e la guerra civile prosegue e si incattivisce.

Edited by Andrea75
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Giuste osservazioni.

Trovo improbabile l'uso delle armi chimiche,ora che i macellai di Assad sono stati eliminati con l'attacco suicida,e ritengo la funzione della NATO limitata al controllo della frontiera con la Turchia,è ovviamente una porta per chi entra e chi esce. La Russia eserciterà fino in fondo quello che sente il suo diritto,ostacolerà l'intervento NATO in sede UN tramite il veto,e metterà i suoi pezzi nello scacchiere Siriano per controllare il dopo Assad.C'è la grossa incognita che ora tutti si sono tolti i guanti,puó succedere qualsiasi cosa fra ribelli e lealisti.

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HMS Illustrious is preparing mass evacuation of Britons from Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.


The British helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious (nicknamed “Lusty”) along with the amphibious assault ship HMS Bulwark are part of contingency plans drawn up by the Royal Navy for a possible mass evacuation of British Passport holders from Syria and bordering countries.

In what is termed a “substantial” Task force, the warships will be deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean for large scale exercises once the Olympic Games have finished and will have the ability to evacuate Britons from the growing violence in Syria.

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Consequences of the Fall of the Syrian Regime


if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.

The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence -- and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so.


Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran's rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad's regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won't happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.


From the American point of view, al Assad's decline opens two opportunities. First, its policy of no direct military intervention but unremitting political and, to a lesser extent, economic pressure appears to be working in this instance. More precisely, even if it had no effect, it will appear that it did, which will enhance the ability of the United States to influence events in other countries without actually having to intervene.

Second, the current situation opens the door for a genuine balance of power in the region that does not require constant American intervention. One of the consequences of the events in Syria is that Turkey has had to reconsider its policy toward countries on its periphery. In the case of Iraq, Turkey has an interest in suppressing the Kurdistan Workers' Party militants who have taken refuge there and defending oil and other economic interests. Turkey's strategy is moving from avoiding all confrontations to avoiding major military commitments while pursuing its political interests. In the end, that means that Turkey will begin moving into a position of balancing Iran for its own interests in Iraq.


A major loser in this is Israel ... he Israelis preferred al Assad to the Sunnis -- until it appeared that the Iranians would dominate Syria. But the possibility of either an Islamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous.


But perhaps the most important losers will be Russia and China. Russia, like Iran, has suffered a significant setback in its foreign policy that will have psychological consequences. The situation in Syria has halted the foreign-policy momentum the Russians had built up. But more important, the Russian and Chinese hope has been that the United States would continue to treat them as secondary issues while it focused on the Middle East. The decline of al Assad and the resulting dynamic in the region increases the possibility that the United States can disengage from the region. This is not something the Russians or Chinese want, but in the end, they did not have the power to create the outcome in Syria that they had wanted.

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  • 2 weeks later...

l'ultimo post aggiunto a questo topic risale al 25 luglio scorso, ma in quel martoriato paese la guerra civile è proseguita e si è incattivita.

Personalmente ho ritenuto di non effettuare aggiornamenti quotidiani sui combattimenti di Aleppo e/o sulle postazioni perse/riconquistate.


Oggi però segnalo questa notizia Siria, in fuga il premier Hijab Attentato alla tv di Stato, vittime


Secondo fonti non governative s'è dimesso, mentre per la tv di Damasco «è stato destituito». Bombardamenti ad Aleppo.

Dopo solo due mesi dalla sua nomina, il premier siriano Riad Hijab non è più tale. La tv di Stato dice che «è stato destituito». Lo riporta senza fornire dettagli sulla vicenda nè le motivazioni della decisione. «Il premier ha disertato dal regime ed è fuggito in Giordania» secondo fonti politiche siriane anti-regime a Beirut. Secondo la tv panaraba al Jazeera il primo ministro siriano Riad Hijab «non sarebbe stato destituito, ma avrebbe scelto la

defezione e si troverebbe già in Turchia». Al-Jazeera cita fonti della famiglia di Hijab. Secondo il direttore dell'Osservatorio siriano per i diritti umani, Rami Abdel Rahman, Hijab ha disertato ed e' fuggito dalla Siria.

Di certo, il presidente Bashar al Assad ha nominato stamani Omar Ghalawanji, già ministro delle amministrazioni locali, premier ad interim incaricato di sbrigare gli affari correnti. Lo riferisce la tv di Stato siriana con una scritta in sovrimpressione.

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Nei tg e sui giornali appaiono notizie spesso in contraddizione fra loro, secondo Voi da chi sono composte le forze che si oppongono al regime baathista di Assad e famiglia? Si è spesso detto che la Siria è un paese sostenuto dalla Russia- in virtù di una alleanza tradizionale che risale già ai tempi della Guerra Fredda- e più nascostamente dall'Iran,per cui si può pensare che gli oppositori siano in qualche modo aiutati dalla NATO, però ci soo molte segnalazioni secondo le quali nelle fila dei combattenti vi sarebbero anche personalità già note come integralisti islamici attivi nel Medio Oriente.

C'è qualcosache non torna, mi pare che gli obiettivi di Occidente ed islamici radicali siano a dire poco opposti, ed anche se al momento queste componenti possono coesistere, mi sembra una coalizione troppo eterogenea per poter arrivare alla vittoria e meno che meno per governare bene il loro sfortunato Paese

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  • 5 weeks later...

Segnalo questo articolo Rebel Groups in Northern Aleppo Province


si tratta si un estratto. Cliccando sul pdf è possibile leggere l'intero paper


Syria’s maturing insurgency


This report examines the increasing effectiveness of Syria’s armed opposition, explains how responsible provincial-level military structures have emerged, and considers how uncoordinated external support could compound existing fractures within the opposition.


Syria’s maturing insurgency has begun to carve out its own de facto safe zones around Homs city, in northern Hama, and in the Idlib countryside. The Assad regime seized key urban centers in Damascus, Homs, and Idlib during offensives in February and March 2012. However, the rebels successfully withdrew into the countryside, where they operate with impunity. As of June 2012, the opposition controls large swaths of Syria’s northern and central countryside.


The Assad regime does not have the capacity to continue offensive operations while holding the key terrain it cleared in the spring. Currently, the regime is postured to hold Damascus, Homs, and Idlib, but not to defeat the insurgency that prospers in the countryside. In order to direct a new offensive against rebel strongholds outside of Homs city and in the Idlib countryside, the regime will have to consolidate forces for a large operation, which could compromise regime control of the urban areas. Increased direct military assistance from Russia or Iran could substantially mitigate this risk to the regime.


Syria’s loyalist security forces will have to balance competing priorities in the summer of 2012. First, they must ensure that fighting does not spread further in northern Aleppo and coastal Latakia provinces. Second, they must regain control of rebel strongholds to the north and south of Homs city. Finally, they must disrupt de facto rebel safe zones in northern Hama and the Idlib countryside.


The insurgency has expanded to an estimated 40,000 men as of late May 2012. New local rebel groups continue to form, which presents a challenge to command and control. However, responsible operational-level structures have emerged in the form of provincial military councils that derive legitimacy from the local rebel groups operating under their command. The provincial military councils operate under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA ), but make their own operational decisions.


Viable provincial military councils have formed in Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deraa, and Damascus. Each military council, or majlis askeri, represents a collection of effective, pre-existing FSA battalions. Each military council coordinates with their political opposition counterparts, the provincial revolutionary councils, or majlis thawar. Some powerful and established rebel organizations have not accepted their military council’s leadership, but enough rebel units have backed the councils to give them legitimacy.


The conflict in Syria is approaching a tipping point at which the insurgency will control more territory than the regime. Neither the perpetuation nor the removal of Assad will guarantee Syria’s future stability. In order to prevent Syrian state failure, the insurgency must mature into a professional armed force that can promote and protect a stable political opposition.


Increased external support for Syria’s insurgency has contributed to its success on the battlefield, but the resulting competition for resources has encouraged radicalization and infighting. This ad hoc application of external support has undermined the professionalization of the opposition’s ranks. Carefully managing this support could reinforce responsible organizations and bolster organic structures within the Syrian opposition.


The priority for U.S. policy on Syria should be to encourage the development of opposition structures that could one day establish a monopoly on the use of force. External support must flow into Syria in a way that reinforces the growth of legitimate and stable structures within the Syrian opposition movement. This will mitigate the regional threats of Syrian state failure and prolonged civil war.

Edited by Andrea75
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