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Guardando un po' in giro per la rete, posso confermare che le cifre riportate nell'articolo di defensenews riguardano solo il bilancio per la Funzione Difesa del relativo ministero. I fondi stanziati dal MiSE sono a parte, in particolare per il 2013 si avrebbero:


Funzione Difesa: 14,4 miliardi come riportato da defensenews +

Fondi Ministero Sviluppo Economico 2,3 miliardi circa (altre fonti parlano invece di 1.763 milioni) +

Fondo missioni all’estero: 1 miliardo circa.

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Questo articolo non aggiunge nulla di nuovo ai dati e alle indicazioni che già conosciamo. Lo segnalo perchè può essere un indicatore utile per la percezione dell'Italia all'estero Italian hard power: Ambitions and fiscal realities


In 2011, Italy had the eighth-largest gross domestic product in the world. Yet, when it comes to converting Italy’s assets into military hard power, the country falls short of the standard set by countries of similar size. A decade ago, Italy’s stated goal was to reverse this trend and, in turn, allow Rome to play a more substantial military role in the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa. While Italy has been an active participant in a number of UN- and NATO-sanctioned international operations, it has never increased its defense spending to the level required to create an all-professional, fully equipped force on par with allied states such as the United Kingdom and France. Compounding this problem is Italy’s current fiscal crisis, which has led to significant reductions in investment and operations accounts. With no sign of budget increases for the Italian military in sight, the defense ministry is now calling for a leaner, more modernized Italian military and the procurement of fewer, albeit newer, military platforms. Can Italy execute these plans without an increase in defense spending, and will the regional and global ambitions Italy once set for its military diminish as forces contract?


For Americans who grew up reading about the sometimes poor performance of Italian forces in World War II or watching movies set in Rome in which the theme is la dolce vita, perhaps this comes as no surprise.

However, Italy remains one of the world’s leading economies; it had the eighth-largest gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011. And, indeed, in terms of the size of its economy and population, the two nations Italy most resembles are France and the United Kingdom. But, in terms of willingness to turn these attributes into hard military power, Rome falls short of benchmarks set by Paris and London.

As figure 1 elucidates, Italy’s defense burden (measured as a percentage of GDP), while never high in the past, has declined even more in recent years.




Italy’s Strategic Vision

Any analysis of Italian grand strategy faces one overriding difficulty: there is no systematic production by the government of national-level strategy papers. To the extent that strategic documents have been issued, more often than not, they have been at the initiative of individual ministers rather than an established policy-planning process.

That said, there have been various government papers issued over the past decade that allow one to tease out Italy’s strategic ambitions, and the military—the government believes—is required to obtain them.


With more than 8,000 of its military deployed abroad—ranging from operations in the Balkans to a stabilization mission in East Timor—Italy was asserting itself in a manner that allowed it to increasingly play a role in that group of nations driving international affairs. The 2001 bump in defense spending was only the first step, the note argued, in Italy’s military acquiring the kind of capabilities needed to match its ambitions and ensuring that it would not be a “mere spectator” in addressing future security problems.

Indeed, by 2006, more than 10,500 of Italy’s military were deployed abroad, including to Iraq and Afghanistan. And while the numbers were “unprecedented” for post–World War II Italy, the note also stipulated that, in light of the generally unpredictable security environment, those numbers could no longer be thought of as “unusual.”


But the ambitions Italy set for itself a little more than a decade ago cannot, as the ministry itself made clear from the start, be fulfilled in the absence of a sustained increase in defense funds. In this context, was the fact that Italy was forced to withdraw its aircraft carrier—the Garibaldi—from ongoing NATO operations against Libya in July 2011 in order to cut costs the low point from which the Italian forces will now move forward, or a harbinger of things to come?


... e riguardo alla missione in Afghanistan

However, the Italian government having sent them—without helicopters, heavy weaponry, or armored land transport—to eastern Afghanistan, there was a limit to what Italian forces could do. As a result, the bulk of their efforts consisted of setting up checkpoints, establishing blocking positions at potential insurgent escape routes, and conducting intelligence-gathering patrols.

Although RC-West (the ISAF designation for the four provinces of Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor over which Italy’s military had overall command for the region) was not a hotbed of Taliban activity by 2006, insurgent activity was increasing in the region. But in an area nearly half the size of Italy and containing more than 2.5 million Afghans, the resources the Italian forces had been provided in manpower, firepower, and transport meant that, even in conjunction with allied forces in the region, fulfilling the ISAF mission of “securing” the region became an increasingly improbable task.

As a result of pressure from both its own military and ISAF allies, Rome did increase the size of the Italian force in RC-West and provided more assistance in terms of armor, jet aircraft, air transport, unmanned aerial vehicles, and attack helicopters. This gave the Italians a greater capacity to engage in blocking operations as the Taliban fled from ISAF operations in nearby Helmand into RC-West and, in a limited number of cases, to participate in operations designed to clear pockets of Taliban in their area of responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that Italian governments—both of the left and the right—have not wanted Italian soldiers to participate in operations in the more dangerous areas in the south or the east regions of the country. And it was only in 2008 that the Italian government modified its caveat that Rome would have to approve any and all requests for Italian forces to assist coalition forces outside of RC-West by lowering the time allotted for it to respond from seventy-two hours to six.


La ristrutturazione delle FFAA

The heart of the plan is to reduce personnel costs, now more than 70 percent of the base defense budget (figure 6), by dropping the active duty numbers authorized from 190,000 to 150,000, and by slicing the civilian work force to 20,000 from its current 30,000. With the cut in force structure, expected savings from eliminated military overhead, and the sale of no-longer-needed infrastructure, the hope is to free up resources for the “investment” and “training” accounts


As for the Italian Air Force, the budget reductions have substantially reduced the number of fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft it will be flying. A decade ago, the initial goal was to replace Italy’s aging fleet of F-104s, AMX fighter bombers, and leased F-16s with a buy of 121 Eurofighter Typhoons, 40 F-35Bs, and 69 F-35As.

The Typhoon order has, however, been cut back to 96, with some 62 now in service; the F-35B buy reduced to 15; and the F-35A purchase pared back by 9.[31] Although these new acquisitions will clearly be an upgrade in individual aircraft capabilities, the fleet itself has declined from 313 fighter aircraft in 2001 to 220 today and, once the 70 or so multi-role, 1970s-designed Tornados are retired from service over the next decade, the Italian tactical fighter fleet could consist of only 150 aircraft.


The Italian Navy is following a similar path. In June 2012, Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli, navy chief, announced that some 26 or 28 vessels would be retired over the next half decade. And although new and more capable platforms will be added to the fleet, overall numbers will drop as the replacement vessels will not be 1:1 for those withdrawn from service. Indeed, to save the cost of decommissioning the ships, the government is looking to sell them at a discount to other countries or, even, to simply give them away.

Examples of the cuts include: reducing the submarine force from the current six to four (about half the number in 2001), dropping the number of new frigates to be bought from ten to six (leaving the total number of frigates at ten after seven or eight older frigates are pulled from service), cutting minesweepers from twelve to eight, and patrol boats from eighteen to ten. Moreover, plans for replacing the retiring carrier Garibaldi and amphibious transport docks with the much larger carrier Cavour and amphibious assault ships (LHDs) has been complicated by a reduced buy of F-35Bs and the freezing of the LHDs acquisition.


The number of army combat brigades has also shrunk. In 1991, there were 19 combat brigades. By 1997, the number had dropped to 13. Under the new plan, the combat brigades will go from the current 11 to 9. Concurrently, the Italian army has seen the number of tanks cut by more than half since 2001, with an equally substantial loss in numbers of field artillery and mortars. Smaller and less “heavy,” the army hopes to use the savings from fielding a leaner force to upgrade its fleet of attack helicopters, increase the capabilities of its special operations forces, and modernize its inventory of land vehicles.


To maximize the effectiveness of its smaller armed forces, the ministry’s plan is to invest in greater service jointness, enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities, a digitalized (net-centric) land force, and upgraded surveillance and target acquisition systems for the navy and air force. And, indeed, other than line items for expenditures on the F-35 program (€548.7 billion) and the final two U-212 submarines (€170.7 billion), the two most expensive programs listed in the defense budget are for programs involving C4I and ground surveillance (€160 billion) and jointness (€154 billion)


Under current plans, Italy’s military will retain a wide spectrum of capabilities befitting a medium-sized global power. As such, according to Di Paola, the government will not only have sufficient “hard power” to ensure Italy’s own defense, but a range of military tools from which Rome can pick and choose how it will involve the country in operations abroad. But without strategic airlift and sealift, Italy will in most instances either require a relatively permissive environment to deploy a substantial number of forces or the assistance of NATO allies.


However, if the United States follows through on its decision to focus more of its attention on ensuring a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and does so by reducing its military footprint in Europe, then countries such as Italy will be expected to do more in meeting their own security needs. And those security tasks appear to be growing, not receding. Not only is Iran’s threat to stability in the Gulf increasing, but the Horn of Africa and large segments of the Mediterranean Basin appear less and less stable—all of which could, and probably will, impact Italy’s security. But with military spending cut to the bone, Italy’s ability to help address those challenges will likely fall short not only of what one might expect of a country its size and economic weight, but also of Rome’s own ambitions at the century’s turn.

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"And, indeed, other than line items for expenditures on the F-35 program (€548.7 billion) and the final two U-212 submarines (€170.7 billion), the two most expensive programs listed in the defense budget are for programs involving C4I and ground surveillance (€160 billion) and jointness (€154 billion)."


Sono ovviamente milioni di € e non miliardi (billions).

Quei dati sono presi dalla Nota Aggiuntiva allo stato di previsione per la Difesa per l'anno 2012, con il dettaglio delle spese, suddivise per Personale Esercizio, Investimento, consultabile qui.


Trovo particolarmente interessante il Riepilogo dei programmi di investimento per tipologia (Allegato C), a partire da pag.96.

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Di Paola a rapporto da Napolitano. Una sequestration italiana? (a proposito, noi qui sul forum della sequestration americana non abbiamo mai parlato)


...non esclude che in questa occasione il ministro abbia rappresentato a Giorgio Napolitano la preoccupazione che possa essere definanziata la legge 808/85. Si tratta, è bene ricordarlo, di una misura con cui il governo sostiene lo sviluppo delle capacità industriali nazionali dell´alta tecnologia nel settore aerospaziale, finanziando progetti di cooperazione europea, di preminente interesse industriale, e quelli funzionali a tecnologie strategiche per programmi riguardanti la sicurezza nazionale. Dal 2004 al 2007, per intenderci, con questo strumento sono stati finanziati progetti militari per oltre un miliardo di euro.


Se il Ministero dello sviluppo economico dovesse calare l´ascia su questa legge, come viene paventato nei corridoi parlamentari, si tratterebbe di un vero e proprio autogol per gli interessi industriali (e di sicurezza nazionale) del Paese.

Non solo, darebbe un´interpretazione errata del tema della sequestration, che da più di un anno riecheggia nel dibattito d´Oltrealtlantico.


Se i fondi del MiSE venissero meno, avete presente quali e quanti programmi di investimento verranno definanziati completamente o in parte? Beh, andate a vederlo nella Nota Aggiuntiva allo stato di previsione per la Difesa per l'anno 2012. Praticamente c'è di tutto. Il programma F-35, ma anche il conmpletamento dei programmi Typhoon e FREMM, l'M-346, l'elicottero CSAR dell'A.M., i sistemi C4I interfoze e per ogni componente, programma Forza NEC, VBM 8x8 FRECCIA, satellite SICRAL 2 e altre cosucce...

Edited by Scagnetti
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Dalla riforma della Difesa niente risparmi ma solo redistribuzione dei fondi. Ma per fare che cosa?



Le polemiche scoppiate intorno all'iter parlamentare di riforma dello strumento militare italiano sono incentrate soprattutto sull'entità dello stanziamento previsto per la Difesa nei prossimi 12 anni (230 miliardi di euro) e sull'autonomia dei vertici militari nell'utilizzo delle risorse determinata dalla delega al Governo e ritenuta eccessiva dagli ambienti pacifisti.


La riforma messa a punto dal ministro Giampaolo Di Paola ha perso per strada la possibilità che la Difesa venda direttamente a Paesi terzi mezzi ed equipaggiamenti surplus delle nostre forze armate e si basa essenzialmente sulla riduzione di 30 mila militari e 10 mila civili a parità di stanziamenti per poter ridistribuire i fondi oggi assorbiti per quasi il 70 per cento dalle retribuzioni al personale. In concreto non vi saranno risparmi nelle spese militari (su questo aspetto si concentrano le critiche dei pacifisti) ma una ridistribuzione della spesa che dovrebbe consentire in futuro di ridurre lo strumento militare per aumentare efficienza e capacità operative. A ben guardare i 230 miliardi spalmati su 12 anni significano 19,16 miliardi annui, cifra inferiore ai 19,96 miliardi del bilancio di quest'anno e ai 20.93 stanziati per il 2013 che scenderanno probabilmente a 20,7 per effetto della legge di stabilità.


Altre critiche, provenienti soprattutto dal Pd, sottolineano come questa riforma non sia partita dall'analisi e dalla dettagliata definizione delle esigenze militari del Paese, sulle quali poi modellare uno strumento militare aggiornato. In pratica riformiamo le forze armate ma per fare cosa? Nuove missioni di pace sotto la bandiera dell'Onu come quella libanese, guerre contro-insurrezionali di tipo afghano o conflitti convenzionali come quello libico? La questione costituisce un punto centrale di ogni "strategic review" elaborata nei Paesi occidentali ed è proprio su grandi temi di indirizzo che si continuano a concentrare le contraddizioni della Difesa italiana. Il 28 novembre scorso il Consiglio Supremo di Difesa ha confermato l'esigenza «di approvare la Riforma entro l'attuale legislatura», di «ridurre gli organici nei tempi previsti» e di garantire «un regolare flusso dei reclutamenti». L'organismo presieduto dal Capo dello Stato ha «convenuto sull'esigenza che le Forze Armate italiane restino comunque pronte a fornire nuovi contributi ad interventi militari della Comunità Internazionale, qualora se ne evidenziasse la necessità».


Un riferimento ai possibili sviluppi della crisi siriana dove l'Onu vorrebbe inviare una forza di pace? O a un intervento contro i qaedisti in Malì? Di fatto l'Italia non tratteggia con chiarezza obiettivi, priorità e soprattutto casa chiedere in futuro ai militari ma ci sui limita a mantenere la capacità di rispondere alle richieste della comunità internazionale, cioè a fare ciò che ci chiederanno Usa, Nato, Onu o Ue. La necessità di mantenersi pronti a nuove missioni oltremare, raccomandata dal Consiglio Supremo di Difesa, cozza però con la distribuzione delle risorse del bilancio delle forze armate (Funzione Difesa) che nel 2013 disporrà di 800/1.000 milioni in più di quest'anno concentrati tutti sull'acquisizione di nuovi mezzi, armi e materiali mentre l'unica voce che subirà (ancora) tagli è quella dell'Esercizio che finanzia i costi di gestione delle infrastrutture, la manutenzione, il rifornimento di mezzi ed equipaggiamenti e l'addestramento. Come si può chiedere alle forze armate di restare «pronte a fornire nuovi contributi ad interventi militari» quando si riducono a 1,33 miliardi (erano 1,52 quest'anno) i fondi per l'Esercizio? Considerato che i costi fissi di basi e caserme sono incomprimibili i tagli si ripercuoteranno sull'addestramento (ormai un miraggio per molti reparti) e persino sulla possibilità di fare il pieno a navi, aerei e mezzi molti dei quali vengono già da tempo sotto utilizzati o immagazzinati o non sono operativi per mancanza di manutenzione. Meglio sarebbe stato distribuire meglio quel miliardo in più stanziato per il 2013 invece di assegnarlo totalmente all'acquisto di mezzi nuovi che non avremo i soldi per impiegare. Eppure la Nota Aggiuntiva al Bilancio della Difesa ammette che «il deterioramento della capacità operativa assumerà a breve termine (uno o due anni) profili di particolare criticità».


Un altro punto fortemente contraddittorio riguarda l'integrazione militare europea, tema finora piuttosto evanescente con l'eccezione del comparto dell'industria della Difesa. A fine febbraio Di Paola disse in un'audizione di presentazione della riforma presso le commissioni congiunte difesa di Camera e Senato che «oggi non esiste di per sé un modello di difesa europeo, non voglio sembrare irriverente ma se aspettiamo il modello di difesa europeo la nostra revisione non la faremo prima di enne anni». Nello stesso consesso il 6 dicembre il ministro ha sottolineato «l'importanza di una politica di sicurezza» comune dicendo che «non è possibile un reale processo di integrazione europea senza una crescita, un approfondimento della dimensione di difesa e sicurezza dell'Unione europea». Per Di Paola il tema è di tale importanza che già nel Consiglio europeo della prossima settimana «per la prima volta ci sarà un grosso capitolo sulle dimensioni della difesa e della sicurezza in Europa». Di Paola ha spiegato che l'Italia ha sviluppato un documento dal titolo More Europe nel quale si sottolineano «cinque aspetti fondamentali per la dimensione europea di Sicurezza e Difesa: impegno, capacità, connettività, connessione, approccio comprensivo».

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Altre critiche, provenienti soprattutto dal Pd, sottolineano come questa riforma non sia partita dall'analisi e dalla dettagliata definizione delle esigenze militari del Paese, sulle quali poi modellare uno strumento militare aggiornato. In pratica riformiamo le forze armate ma per fare cosa? Nuove missioni di pace sotto la bandiera dell'Onu come quella libanese, guerre contro-insurrezionali di tipo afghano o conflitti convenzionali come quello libico? La questione costituisce un punto centrale di ogni "strategic review" elaborata nei Paesi occidentali ed è proprio su grandi temi di indirizzo che si continuano a concentrare le contraddizioni della Difesa italiana. Il 28 novembre scorso il Consiglio Supremo di Difesa ha confermato l'esigenza «di approvare la Riforma entro l'attuale legislatura», di «ridurre gli organici nei tempi previsti» e di garantire «un regolare flusso dei reclutamenti». L'organismo presieduto dal Capo dello Stato ha «convenuto sull'esigenza che le Forze Armate italiane restino comunque pronte a fornire nuovi contributi ad interventi militari della Comunità Internazionale, qualora se ne evidenziasse la necessità».



indipendentemente dal colore, finalmente qualcuno che parte dalle fondamenta, per costruire una casa.

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... intervista al Ministro Di Paola Q and A with Giampaolo di Paola Italy’s Defense Minister


Giampaolo di Paola was named Italian defense minister in the government of “technocrats” headed by Mario Monti, which took office after Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned in November 2011. Monti’s government was due to step down by next April to make way for elections, but Monti has said he will resign at the end of this year following his loss of parliamentary support.

Di Paola, a retired admiral, this year has steered a major reform of the Italian armed forces through parliament, which trims 30,000 personnel, including a heavy reduction in senior officers; cuts military bases; and sells ships and land systems. The cuts are an attempt to reflect shrinking defense spending.

After commanding submarines with the Italian Navy, Di Paola rose to become Italy’s procurement chief in 2001 and then head of the General Staff. In 2008, he took over the NATO military committee until he was recalled to Rome by Monti.


Q. What is the scale of Italy’s military reform, and is it comparable to what other nations are doing?

A. This is a big deal, because for the first time we took stock of the reality of the funds available. We asked how can we improve capacity with the resources we have. It is those resources which have driven the reform.

But we are not simply cutting people to buy equipment — we are balancing resources in line with what other allies are doing. NATO and Europe tell us to have flexible expeditionary forces with real capabilities, and as such, quality becomes more important than quantity.


Q. Which Army brigades will be cut, and will we need further decrees to make it happen?

A. We will cut brigades from 11 to around nine, rearranging regiments, cutting the less agile brigades, which have less use in overseas operations. We will focus on medium, mechanized brigades.

We will need three or four further decrees to implement the law, which will need to be passed by parliamentary commissions, which may add recommendations. That will happen after the election, and I believe it is correct that the new government will oversee that.

The decrees will not have details on exactly what platforms are cut; that will be decided further along, depending on what resources are available.


Q. With the manpower cuts, will Italy be able do what it is doing now in the Balkans, Lebanon and Afghanistan?

A. Yes. Only part of our structure can be deployed today, leaving us with overhead.

If we can increase the deployable percentage, if we can have a leaner structure, we can do the same as before — and, I would dare to say, do it even better. We have redundant personnel today. So cutting manpower will not affect the number of personnel we can deploy overseas.

There will also be a 30 percent cut to the number of generals and admirals. Their number is a legacy from when we had a larger, conscript military. The military turned professional, but the number of generals stayed the same. There will also be a strengthening of the General Staff command level.


Q. Under the reform, the military will give up the use of 30 percent of its bases and barracks in Italy. Will that mean cash from sales for military spending?

A. We are talking about hundreds of military properties in Italy, which will be sold off by the Italian government. The value of that property could be a billion euros or more. Most of the proceeds will be used to help pay off Italy’s national debt, with around 30 percent coming back to us, unlike what happened in the U.K. This is a process that will last almost 10 years.


Q. The Navy is planning the sale of naval vessels to other navies as part of the planned cuts. Can you say which navies are possible buyers?

A. We are at an advanced stage in talks to sell Maestrale-class vessels to the Philippines. We are talking to Tunisia about Minerva corvettes and to South American navies about Maestrale vessels. Bangladesh was looking at the same type, but those talks did not reach a result. I am due to visit Vietnam for talks. We have had some early interest from the [Arabian] Gulf area on submarines.

As for the sale of new vessels, we are pursuing Brazil and others. Algeria has purchased a landing platform dock, although for a light frigate, they opted for another country. There is continued interest from Algeria in other vessels, and the country is requesting investment in a shipyard.


Q. Spending on maintenance and operations (M&O) drops in 2013 to 1.33 billion euros, a 50 percent drop from 2008. What are the consequences?

A. The only way to compensate for the dramatic reduction in M&O is to focus resources on the units that we are rotating for deployment. We have been selective and sacrificed the readiness of certain units, trying to retain a nucleus of highly trained and effective forces.

The drop in M&O has really driven the current reform. We have to regain money to put into M&O before procurement. The European Defence Agency tells us that Europe spent, on average, 119,000 euros per soldier in 2010. Italy spends 79,000 euros, so we have a 40 percent gap.

For the money we have, we have too many people and too many structures. I have always said that the first resource we have is the man, but only as long as he is well trained, well equipped. Otherwise, he becomes a liability.


Q. The reduction in M&O spending has forced the armed forces to mothball platforms. How many, and what lies ahead?

A. Right now, around over 50 percent of our Ariete tanks are not in use, and we are deciding what to do. That is the most critical example.

In the next five years, 20 percent of Navy vessels will be on reduced readiness status and considered on sale. We will probably need to cut our platforms across the board by 20 percent.


Q. Italy has sought rapid procurement of force protection equipment to keep troops safe in Afghanistan, from vehicles to gun turrets to anti-IED technologies. How can you get ahead of the curve on force protection? What comes next?

A. Physical force protection is key, meaning lighter, tougher composite materials, but also detection, meaning better aerial surveillance of routes and unmanned vehicles running in front of vehicles to detect threats and take the impact. That is a project we are working on with our NATO and European partners. And better training, which you need to do on the ground.

That is what Afghanistan has taught us. If you do not run operations, you will discover that on the next operation, you are out of the game.


Q. You have said the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will cost less than the Eurofighter Typhoon. Can you back that up with figures? And will Italy lose work on the JSF because it cut its order from 131 to 90?

A. What I meant was that most of the development costs of the JSF were paid by the U.S. We bore the brunt of the cost of developing the Eurofighter. It is not the single cost of the aircraft I referred to, but the total, including development.

We will not lose work because of the reduction in orders; 131 was an approximate number and we still remain a major buyer, and we have invested. We are the only nation outside the U.S. with a final assembly line, and we are building a central section of the JSF, which will supply U.S. versions.


Q. Despite shrinking budgets, Italy is purchasing an optical satellite and early warning planes from Israel. How far was that pushed by the reciprocal purchase of the M346 trainer jet by Israel?

A. It was very important. We had a requirement and they wanted the M346, and the package was built around this cooperation. We are each spending about the same amount of money. It was a good deal and a smart deal.

Optical satellites have always been a military requirement that we have so far satisfied with the exchange of data with the French, using the Helios satellite. That has not been fully satisfactory, particularly during operations, when we wanted optical data to augment our satellite radar data. We are taking this opportunity.

We want to continue to work in the European framework, but maybe this will allow us to negotiate a better cooperation deal with France as we continue to develop our Cosmo Skymed radar satellite capability.

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  • 1 year later...

Oggi il premier Renzi ha rilasciato un’intervista in cui ha definito in 390 milioni i tagli al bilancio della difesa per il 2014. Non è chiaro se l’ammontare dei tagli al bilancio per i prossimi anni sarà di 900 o 1800 milioni. Ricordo che per finanziare la "manovra" Renzi nel 2014 servono 6,9 miliardi di euro, ma nel 2015 ben 14 miliardi. Ovviamente il bilancio della difesa svolge il ruolo del piccione con grande acclamazione pubblica.


Per il momento non c’è niente di scritto e abbiamo solo un intervista. Di questi 390 milioni per il 2014, ha dichiarato che circa 150 dovrebbero venire da "spostamenti e rimodulazione della spesa" per il programma F-35.


Ciò dovrebbe significare per tale programma il taglio della LRIP 9, da 3 a 2 jet (1 A e un B invece di 2 e 1) di cui sapevamo da qualche mese (i contratti italiani per il lotti iniziali precedenti sono già stati contrattualizzati e molto difficili da tagliare) e in aggiunta la sospensione dei fondi per i long lead items relativi alla LRIP 10.


A margine spicca il silenzio della Ministra Pinotti, il cui silenzio in questi giorni è assordante. La Pinotti per me è solo una YesWoman, al contrario del Ministro della Sanità Lorenzin, subito inalberatasi contro eventuali tagli al bilancio del suo ministero.


Non è chiaro se saranno sottoposti a tagli anche i fondi stanziati per la "legge navale" appena pochi mesi fa.

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