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Marina Cinese


Rick86
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Beh i cinesi da qualcosa dovranno pur partire. La Varyag come unità training e due CV medie come primo passo? Plausibile?

 

Plausibilissimo, ma non immediato. Il fatto stesso che si continui a parlare di portaerei cinesi e non si vedano mai, la dice lunga: assomiglia al PakFa (o al Deserto dei Tartari).

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March 10/09: The Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper reports that Russia is refusing to sell China SU-33 jets, citing past piracy of the design for its SU-27 fighters. China initially sought 2 SU-33s for its “trial basis” order, which are a modified variant of the SU-27. Subsequent negotiations reportedly raised the “trial” order to 14 of the 50 aircraft China said it wanted, but that was not enough to remove the basic problem.

 

In 1995, China received a license for the production of 200 Su-27SK fighters; that agreement was later terminated at 95 planes. China cushioned the blow by ordering a total of 110 SU-30MK2s between 1999-2003, but they are now producing a “J-11B” fighter that appears to be an SU-27 with Chinese radar and avionics, and Chinese WS-10 engines in place of Russian Lyulka AL-31s. The issue was reportedly raised at the 13th meeting of the Russian-Chinese Committee for Military Cooperation in December 2008, without resolution.

 

If Russia believes that its SU-33s are being ordered so they can be cloned by the Chinese, creating a future with no further orders from China, and a cheaper version of their weapons offered for global export, then their lack of interest in a deal is understandable.

 

Note that concerns are also being raised in Russia around ongoing production of Russian-derived Cold War era designs by Eastern European countries, which could create future diplomatic incidents. Pravda report

 

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/china-...2806/#more-2806

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In effetti non è molto preciso su certe cose, quest'estate gli avevo pure mandato una mail per dirgli che ha la scheda riepilogativa delle CV mondiali sballata, il GG ha 18 aerei, il Cavour 20 :asd: non si sa come la PdA 29 e che diavolo centra la BPE (con le CV :asd:) con 30.

Già questo...

a parte sta follia che nel pda ci vanno piuaerei che nella cavour..ma anche la invincible.. con 7000 tons meno che la cavour e meno sapazio..puo imbarcare 29 aerei..che sciocchezza...sara qualche solito angloamericano a cui gli e' stata rubata la moglie da qualche italiano

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Guest intruder
a parte sta follia che nel pda ci vanno piuaerei che nella cavour..ma anche la invincible.. con 7000 tons meno che la cavour e meno sapazio..puo imbarcare 29 aerei..che sciocchezza...sara qualche solito angloamericano a cui gli e' stata rubata la moglie da qualche italiano

 

 

Che c'azzecca con la Marina Cinese tutto sto discorso?

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Sul blog della FAS ci sono molte informazioni aggiornate al 2009 con cui tracciare un quadro abbastanza preciso della flotta sottomarina cinese.

 

SSBN

 

- lo XIA ha concluso un ciclo di grandi lavori durato più di un anno. Non si sa se il sottomarino sia finalmente diventato operativo oppure se verrà usato solo come piattaforma sperimentale, comunque i cinesi non hanno fino ad ora condotto un pattugliamento di deterrenza con SSBN. In questa bella foto satellitare possiamo vedere il bacino vuoto dello Xia, lo Xia ormeggiato dalla parte opposta della base e tutti e 5 gli SSN cinesi, 4 sicuramente Han e uno, che pare leggermente più lungo, dovrebbe essere il nuovo tipo Shang (per la verità io ne ho trovati solo due, chi mi trova gli altri?)

 

subbase.jpg

 

- oltre allo Xia i cinesi hanno lanciato almeno 3 sottomarini tipo 094 Jin. Ecco una foto satellitare degli ultimi due lanciati

JinSSBNs.jpg. L\'intelligence americana stima in 5 il numero complessivo della classe, al fine di averne sempre almeno uno in mare. Il fatto che li stiano costruendo a ritmo accellerato potrebbe voler dire che hanno intenzione presto di incominciare i loro pattugliamenti. Infatti, a livello teorico, una volta che inizi un pattugliamento con SSBN, devi essere in grado di sostituire a tempo indefinito l\'unità usata.

Qua sotto potete vedere un confronto tra il compartimento missili dello Xia (32 m, 1770 km di raggio dei missili, singola testata) con quello da 34m dei jin che imbarcheranno il nuovo missile Julang 2 (8000km, singola testata, questa è la miglior stima per la FAS)

 

SSBNs.jpg

 

JinSSBNx.jpg

 

SSN

 

- i cinesi hanno ancora in servizio 4 dei 5 vecchissimi e rumorosissimi Han (tipo 091). Sono unità così superate, rumorose e addirittura mal schermate come radiazioni (per l\'equipaggio) da avere un valore bellico praticamente nullo.

han.jpg

 

- più interessante il loro progetto 093 Shang. Armato con 6 tubi da 533mm, pare essere strettamente derivato dal Victor III, anche se è probabile adotti tecnologie rubate dai los angeles americani. E\' comunque una nave inferiore per capacità, silenziosità e sensori ad una qualsiasi unità occidentale. Tra l\'una e le tre unità dovrebbero essere al momento disponibili

 

PATTUGLIAMENTI al 2008

 

china2008.jpg

 

La tabella mostra come i cinesi abbiano sensibilmente aumentato i loro pattugliamenti nel 2008. Fate attenzione che con la parola pattugliamenti si intende una crociera non addestrativa sensibilmente lontano dalla base. Non include tutte le crociere addestrative e le uscite dal porto di pochi giorni. Se 12 su 54 unità pare essere una media bassa, è probabile che i cinesi usino attivamente solo i loro sottomarini più nuovi. Come detto prima nessun pattugliamento di SSBN, quindi parliamo di SSN ma, sopratutto, dei loro SSK

CONSISTENZA NUMERICA

 

subforce.jpg

 

In calando per i sottomarini convenzionali, poichè mentre vengono dismessi grandi quantità di vecchie ed obsolete unità ne vengono si costruite di nuove e più sofisticate (i cinesi non solo hanno i Kilo, ma anche i Song e gli Yuan unità più nuove e migliorate rispetto al progetto russo di partenza) ma in numero minore.

Stabile il numero degli SSN (pare rimarrà intorno ai 5, almeno per ora).

In aumento deciso il numero degli SSBN, proprio per il motivo visto prima, arrivare a disporne abbastanza da poter incominciare a mantenere in permanenza un deterrente in mare.

Edited by Rick86
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BASI

 

chinamap.jpg

 

Chinasub.jpg

 

Questa è la loro base principale. 6 moli, un bacino, 1 tunnel per una base sotterranea e numerose strutture manutentive. Il tutto racchiuso da una grande baia di quasi 2km di lato. La cosa più interessante è la possibilità che dispongano di un accesso subacqueo per dei dock costruiti all\'interno della roccia

The most intriguing feature of the base is the underground submarine facility located in the southeastern end of the bay. The facility consists of a large submarine entrance from the harbor, a pier side entrance to the south, and a land entrance to the east (see image). The submarine entrance is approximately 43 feet (13 meters) wide and appears to be arched by a large concrete structure. Both of the land-entrances are approximate 33 feet (10 meters) wide and appear to have what may be a railway system connected to the interior of the facility.

 

Subcavefinal.jpg

 

Sicuramente esiste il posto per uno Xia e, probabilmente, anche per le strutture necessarie per caricare i SLBM.

 

Xialoadout.jpg

Load-out di un SLBM J-1 sullo Xia.

 

Chinaxia.jpg

Lo Xia alla base

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Complimeti a Rick per il post!

Per i cinesi: Direi che per qualche hanno saremo ancora in vantaggio tecnologicamente,ma per il futuro non si sà,con gli USA non tanto invogliati a spendere nel campo militare, e i cinesi che giorno dopo giorno espandono il loro,seppur arretrato,sapere è meglio stare in campana.

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No nel campo sottomarino i cinesi sono lontani anni luce dagli ami. La preoccupazione grossa è quella che possano rubare e copiare la tecnologia occidentale (come hanno già fatto). E ai russi non gli passa manco per la testa di dargli il meglio della loro tecnologia, a quanto pare tutto quello che hanno fatto è stato dargli i piani del vecchio Victor III (due generazioni indietro rispetto ai futuri SSN russi Yasen).

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Fermo restando che certe tecnologie è meglio ce le teniamo strette, non riesco a vedere i cinesi come nemici. Tutte le volte che vado in Cina e ho a che fare coi miei colleghi locali, vedo degli americani con gli occhi a mandorla. E i businessmen che incontro a Pechino, e, soprattutto, Shangai, non hanno nulla di diverso da quelli che puoi trovare allo stock exchange di Wall Street. Sono affaristi, come tali assolutamente privi di scrupoli, ma non gli passa nemmeno per il cervello di distruggere il nostro sistema, a differenza dei comunisti sovietici di un tempo e dei fondamentalisti di varie religioni oggi.

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Naval Expansion Makes China a Growing Power

 

 

In late 2008 and during the first weeks of 2009, Chinese and Russian sources provided new insights into China’s ambitions to build aircraft carriers and air wings to equip them. This data was then assessed in light of China’s momentous December 2008 decision to dispatch a small People’s Liberation Army Navy flotilla to prosecute Somali pirates (see related story on p. 21), resulting in wide commentary about the country’s ambitions to build a much larger conventional navy. Absent from much of this analysis, however, is an adequate understanding of China’s progress in assembling a phalanx of space, air and naval forces designed to pose an effective asymmetrical threat to large conventional navies.

 

A three-level Chinese military challenge is unfolding for Washington and its allies. A long-standing debate over whether China intends to build a large conventional navy to defend its increasingly global interests is being settled in the affirmative, justifying a continued investment by the U.S. and its allies in large naval forces. At the same time China’s success in fielding effective asymmetrical capabilities makes necessary the development of defensive systems, it also undermines the continued justification for large conventional platforms like aircraft carriers, which could be sunk if found. A third challenge emerges when China successfully deploys its asymmetrical systems, either on unique platforms or by sale of elements to allies.

 

Much of the justification for this large technology and capability investment has been provided by China’s requirement to quickly assemble the means to prevent the U.S. from aiding Taiwan if China forces “unification” without building a correspondingly large conventional military. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners in the early 1990s assessed that if U.S. military access to the western Pacific was denied or impeded, China’s military threats to Taiwan would become more credible and have the desired political effects. This period begins to see early PLA efforts to invest in modern military capabilities: new C4ISR systems; space and airborne weapons; and a naval expansion that focuses on regional-denial capabilities.

 

This is China’s near-term goal, but it also provides building blocks for future power projection. Perhaps the most important enabler for the PLA’s transition from a regional to a global force will be advances in C4ISR. A key aspiration of PLA doctrine since the late 1990s has been to apply ever more sophisticated information technologies to military endeavors. With its roots in the now famous 1986 “863 Program” to fund high-technology military research, C4ISR progress has benefited from the PLA building one of the world’s most advanced national fiber-optic grids in the 1990s, plus creation of one of the world’s leading computer chip and hardware sectors. These have enabled the PLA’s steady progress in creating C4ISR capabilities in space, on the ground and in cyberwarfare.

 

China has made dramatic progress in building space information architecture with communication, navigation and surveillance satellites. So far the PLA controls only two dedicated communication satellites, one of which supports Ka-band tactical communication links. But the PLA is thought to have access to a larger number of communication satellites controlled by China’s satellite companies.

 

An initial constellation of four BeiDou navigation satellites (navsat) was placed in orbit in April 2007. Only capable of China-region coverage with the help of ground-station broadcasts, they have a secondary text-communication function. China’s larger goal is to loft a 30-satellite Compass navsat constellation by 2015. This will provide global coverage and complement and compete with the U.S. GPS, Russian Glonass and European Galileo navsat systems.

 

China launched the first two HuangJing high-resolution electro-optical surveillance satellites on Sept. 5, 2008. These will eventually comprise a constellation of at least four electro-optical and four Russian-aided radar satellites, the first to be launched this year. This follows the YaoGan surveillance satellite constellation, which consists so far of two planar radar satellites and two electro-optical satellites. China intends to fly some of these satellites in formation, which could yield data to support 360-deg. mapping and 3D mission-planning programs. An electro-optical, surveillance-satellite program with Brazil was recently extended by three satellites (making five total), and China has long been a major consumer of commercial satellite imagery. Chinese sources also indicate that the PLA is developing dedicated missile-early-warning satellites.

 

An important achievement was the Apr. 25, 2008, launch of the PLA’s first TianLan data-relay satellite, which supported last September’s Shenzhou-7 manned space mission. More capable data-relay satellites that will support real-time global targeting missions can be expected. With a competitive small-satellite sector centered in aerospace universities, China is fast emerging as a leading developer of micro- (50 kg., or 110 lb.), nano- (30 kg. and less) and pico- (5 kg. and less) satellites. China launched three microsatellite missions in 2008, including BanXing-1, which operated in formation with Shenzhou-7. China, like other space powers, expects that expensive large-bus satellites will give way to formations of less expensive, less vulnerable and easier to replenish microsatellites.

 

PLA inner-space surveillance capabilities include advances in radar and electronic intelligence systems. A recent network of bistatic, long-range, over-the-horizon radar facilities for the first time allow the PLA to monitor naval and air activities more than 1,000 km. (620 mi.) at sea. The PLA has added fixed and mobile tactical radars, including active phased array, digitally enhanced long-wave radar useful for counterstealth operations and long-range passive radar similar to the Ukrainian Kolchuga system, which China reportedly purchased. China has many electronic intelligence and signals intelligence facilities, including sites in Cuba and, reportedly, Myanmar.

 

PLA surveillance capabilities will soon be enhanced by the acquisition of high-altitude long-endurance (HALE), medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and vertical-takeoff unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Chengdu Aircraft Corp. is developing a HALE UAV that is a dead-ringer for Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk, while Guizhou Aircraft is developing a novel box-wing HALE drone. Guizhou and Chengdu are also developing MALE UAVs, while vertical UAVs are emerging from China’s helicopter companies and design groups.

 

Command and communication capabilities benefit from a proliferation of digital and broadband platforms across all PLA services, which aid the development and implementation of joint-forces doctrines and more efficient command structures. National, theater and field-level command posts combine data and video from top command sources to the field, for use along the command chain, while broadband capabilities have helped revolutionize PLA logistics and access to military education. The laptop computer is becoming ubiquitous in the PLA.

 

In addition, the PLA has made strides in equipping its services with modern computer-based training simulators, from fighter cockpits to submarine command decks, missile and tank crew trainers and personal computer-based infantry-decision trainers. It is reasonable to expect the PLA to follow the example of the U.S. and others in creating networked simulation training for disparate joint forces.

 

An example of increasing C4ISR prowess occurred last Dec. 8, when according to Chinese accounts, China’s maritime surveillance agency was able to take advantage of precise information concerning the location and patterns of Japan’s coast guard ships, to catch the latter by surprise and move its ships in to assert claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea.

 

The PLA’s precision surveillance is being combined with new capabilities for precision strike—see our next installment.

 

 

Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center of Arlington, Va., and author of China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Praeger, 2008).

 

 

www.aviationweek.com

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I due galli hanno troppi interessi in comune per andare oltre qualche limitato starnazzo.

Ed infatti le forniture militari ai Taiwanesi sono parecchi diminuite negli ultimi anni, anzi sono diminuite in alcuni settori perchè sono recenti le vendite di P-3C e batterie Patriot ma di F-16 non ne vogliono sapere.

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Guest intruder

Chinese Develop Special "Kill Weapon" to Destroy U.S. Aircraft Carriers

 

Advanced missile poses substantial new threat for U.S. Navy

 

 

U. S. Naval Institute

March 31, 2009

 

 

 

With tensions already rising due to the Chinese navy becoming more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy seems to have yet another reason to be deeply concerned.

 

After years of conjecture, details have begun to emerge of a "kill weapon" developed by the Chinese to target and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.

 

First posted on a Chinese blog viewed as credible by military analysts and then translated by the naval affairs blog Information Dissemination, a recent report provides a description of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that can strike carriers and other U.S. vessels at a range of 2000km.

 

The range of the modified Dong Feng 21 missile is significant in that it covers the areas that are likely hot zones for future confrontations between U.S. and Chinese surface forces.

 

The size of the missile enables it to carry a warhead big enough to inflict significant damage on a large vessel, providing the Chinese the capability of destroying a U.S. supercarrier in one strike.

 

Because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It is estimated that the missile can travel at mach 10 and reach its maximum range of 2000km in less than 12 minutes.

 

Supporting the missile is a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate U.S. ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets.

 

While the ASBM has been a topic of discussion within national defense circles for quite some time, the fact that information is now coming from Chinese sources indicates that the weapon system is operational. The Chinese rarely mention weapons projects unless they are well beyond the test stages.

 

If operational as is believed, the system marks the first time a ballistic missile has been successfully developed to attack vessels at sea. Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack.

 

Along with the Chinese naval build-up, U.S. Navy officials appear to view the development of the anti-ship ballistic missile as a tangible threat.

 

 

df-21_launcher.jpg

The ASBM is said to be a modified DF-21

 

 

 

 

After spending the last decade placing an emphasis on building a fleet that could operate in shallow waters near coastlines, the U.S. Navy seems to have quickly changed its strategy over the past several months to focus on improving the capabilities of its deep sea fleet and developing anti-ballistic defenses.

 

As analyst Raymond Pritchett notes in a post on the U.S. Naval Institute blog:

 

"The Navy's reaction is telling, because it essentially equals a radical change in direction based on information that has created a panic inside the bubble. For a major military service to panic due to a new weapon system, clearly a mission kill weapon system, either suggests the threat is legitimate or the leadership of the Navy is legitimately unqualified. There really aren't many gray spaces in evaluating the reaction by the Navy…the data tends to support the legitimacy of the threat."

 

In recent years, China has been expanding its navy to presumably better exert itself in disputed maritime regions. A recent show of strength in early March led to a confrontation with an unarmed U.S. ship in international waters.

 

 

 

http://www.usni.org/forthemedia/ChineseKillWeapon.asp

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Guest intruder

Secondo l'articolo la guida è linkata via satelliti e aerei da ricognizione, soluzione in origine (1974 o giù di lì) prevista anche per il Tomahawk.

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