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Diciamo che, nel caso dovessero acquistare il Rafale, che comunque è tra i candidati, ci sarebbe sovrapposizione tra Mirage 2000 e quest'ultimo. Quello che intendo è che al giorno d'oggi anche la distinzione tra caccia pesanti, medi e leggeri è ridotta a quella tra leggeri e pesanti, come negli USA furono Falcon ed Eagle ed ora Raptor e Lightning, ed addirittura si stanno coprendo con lo stesso tipo missioni da superiorità aerea e bombardamento, quindi già far convivere Mirage e Jaguar è un paradosso, dato che il primo ha ottime capacità di cacciabombardiere, esattamente come è un paradosso far convivere MiG-29 e MiG-27, dato che il primo può svolgere egregiamente le funzioni del secondo.

 

Praticamente in India vogliono applicare il concetto di multiruolo direttamente all'MMRCA senza passare dalla "multiruolizzazione" dei vecchi tipi già in servizio. Si sono spinti oltre l'avere un tipo di nazionalità diversa per ogni specialità. Hanno almeno due tipi di nazionalità diversa per ogni specialità e non hanno accorpato le specialità in modo da standardizzare la flotta, cosa che gli avrebbe permesso di avere botte piena (le capacità operative effettive) e moglie ubriaca (la diversificazione dei fornitori).

 

E' come se l'AMI avesse:

  • per il bombardamento Tornado IDS ed F-111
  • per l'attacco AMX e G-91 ancora in servizio
  • per la superiorità aerea pesante l'F-15
  • per la superiorità aerea media EF-2000 e Tornado ADV
  • per la superiorità aerea leggera l'F-5 e l'F-16

Eccessivo dai...

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Dobbiamo dire però che, dopo la scelta del vincitore, l' India radierà molti dei suoi caccia.

Mig 21 e jaguar in primis,poi anche i Mirage 2000....

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Domande in attesa di risposta ....

 

Fonte: Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 11, 2011)

 

Indian Fighter Downselect Questions Remain

 

By Asia-Pacific Staff

New Delhi

 

 

Perhaps it should come as no surprise, given India’s notoriety when it comes to defense procurement, that the downselect in its high-profile fighter competition has raised an unusual number of questions.

 

At issue is not so much who survived in the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contest as how the downselect was conducted. The Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale were rated highly before the field was winnowed, but the losing contenders—the Boeing F/A18F Super Hornet, Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper, Saab Gripen IN and MiG MiG-35—have many unanswered questions.

 

Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Saab all have asked the government for a debriefing on why they were eliminated from the $12 billion competition to build at least 126 fighters. MiG did not join that appeal.

 

The defense ministry has made no public statement on the dramatic elimination, though officials on the acquisition team wonder what more information they can supply the losing vendors “over and above what we already have.”

 

Rather than naming Eurofighter and Dassault winners, the government asked them to extend the validity of their commercial bids till the end of the year and resubmit those documents by May 13. Bids expired at the end of April. The others were not asked to take that step.

 

The unusual procedure has some questioning what lies ahead. An official with one of the losing vendors says that “if the Typhoon and Rafale won this round on technical compliance and performance grounds, who says it’ll play out the same way on price? These planes are not cheap.”

 

With the defense ministry opting to choose between two of the most expensive fighters in the competition, there is a sense that negotiations could still fail, in light of the Indian defense establishment’s legendary sensitivity to unit price. “The known prices of the two final contenders could throw budgetary allocations for the MMRCA acquisition completely out of gear. The finance ministry won’t like that one single bit,” agrees an Indian air force officer who observed field trials of the six aircraft at the Leh air base in the Himalayas.

 

Saab CEO Hakan Bushke is even more explicit. “We are still offering the Indian government the Gripen,” he said after the company noted it was not selected. In these processes, there can be changes of direction, he added.

 

A price war is also not being ruled out, in part because Dassault is eager to secure the first export order for Rafale and Eurofighter officials have signaled they will be aggressive in pursuing the deal.

 

As things stand, commercial bids of the two finalists will be reviewed and compared to a previously established benchmark price, with the offer closest to the figure deemed the lowest bidder. Discussions on the $4.75 billion in offsets will also take place.

 

The decision not to pick either of the U.S. competitors has also raised questions about whether New Delhi is sending Washington a political signal over technology transfer or other issues.

 

When asked if the Pentagon’s policy on transferring sensitive electronics and sensor codes played a role in the decision, an Indian officer says, “The request for proposals is very clear about what technologies and software we expect to be fully transferred. If certain vendors have put forward bids which are not compliant with that requirement as a result of their home government’s export and transfer policies, that is something the [defense ministry] has taken into account while making its decision.”

 

Washington has been intensely courting New Delhi not just for this deal, but more broadly to strengthen the bilateral relationship. In that vein, the U.S. offered what it considered heavy inducements in the realm of technology transfer on the MMRCA, although Indian officials were skeptical about some of the associated caveats.

 

The U.S. bidders are reluctant to complain too loudly, though, not wishing to upset a military customer with whom they have other commercial interests. For instance, India is buying Lockheed Martin C-130Js and Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft while also considering Boeing C-17s and AH-64D Apache attack helicopters. Industry officials also believe the Boeing F/A-18E/F could still be a contender for a future Indian navy carrier aircraft requirement.

 

Indian officials are somewhat defensive about complaints that they have not been transparent and the MMRCA process has been confusing. “If there is a sense that this outcome was a surprise, then that is not correct,” says an officer on the defense ministry’s acquisition team. “In the spirit of the process, each vendor was briefed in a highly transparent manner about their performance in technical and field evaluation trials as well as compliance at every step. The sharing of information was done in such a way that the vendors who lost definitely knew that they were not making it.”

 

Indian air force chief PV Naik also dismisses the notion that the surprise expressed by the losing vendors had anything to do with the process. “Whether anyone is happy or unhappy, we have done whatever we were asked to do by the government. If you select one aircraft, it always happens that the other side would be dissatisfied. There is nothing wrong with our process. It is a human feeling,” he says. Nevertheless, the MMRCA acquisition team has been instructed by Defense Minister AK Antony to ensure that dissatisfaction among the losing vendors does not translate into delays in the remainder of the process.

 

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I motivi di una esclusione ....

 

DATE: 03/06/11

SOURCE: Flight International

 

Tellis: US fighters lost MMRCA contract due to technical faults

 

By Stephen Trimble

 

Both US bids for a major Indian Air Force fighter contract lost because of technical faults - not US export control policies or corruption in New Dehli, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar Ashley Tellis said in an interview.

 

The former American diplomat in New Dehli arrived at his conclusions after a three-week trip to India that included meetings with top Indian government, military and industry officials. The IAF selected the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon as finalists for the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).

 

By excluding the Boeing F/A-18E/F and the Lockheed Martin F-16 - as well as the Saab Gripen and MiG-35 - the Indian government angered Washington DC, as well as set off a wave of speculation that the decision was based on concerns in New Dehli about overly restrictive US export policies.

 

But Tellis believes that interpretation of the MMRCA downselect is incorrect, while providing the most detailed assessment of the factors that led to the final decision.

 

According to Tellis' sources in the IAF, the F-16IN bid received low marks in the technical evaluation for a slow turn rate and poorer handling performance due to the addition of conformal fuel tanks.

 

Those deficiencies made the F-16IN less competitive in dogfights against older F-16 Block 50s, which are operated by Pakistan.

 

The Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet was the US government's best shot to win the contract, but it was also hampered in the Indian evaluation by poor manoeuvrability compared to the European fighters, Tellis said.

 

Boeing's bid proposed to improve the Super Hornet's power by introducing the General Electric F414 enhanced performance engine (EPE), with 20% higher thrust.

 

But the Indian evaluators refused to credit the EPE because it is a developmental item, Tellis said. This contrasted with India's acceptance of active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar technology by the European bidders despite its developmental status.

 

"They just gambled on the fact that they were going to get an AESA by the time the airplane was going to enter the force," Tellis said.

 

The decision also reflected the IAF's preference for an aircraft with strong dogfighting performance over a combat style emphasising beyond visual range engagements using long-range sensors, Tellis said.

 

Indian officials expressed no concerns about the US government's export policies, which would have required heavy monitoring by US officials if certain sensors and avionics systems were included in Boeing's or Lockheed's bid, Tellis said.

 

"What they would have done in this case was demand that the vendor [substitute] equipment that did not have [monitoring] constraints," Tellis said. India had agreed to a similar arrangement with the acquisition of the Boeing P-8A Poseidon.

 

Despite the initial reaction by Washington officials, both sides are cooling off since the announcement, he added.

 

"The damage was certainly serious," Tellis said. "But both sides have understood how this outcome came out and both sides have made efforts to get beyond it. The US is going to win many more competitions in India."

 

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A margine del programma MMRCA .... un commento di Bill Sweetman sulle prospettive dei modelli europei rimasti in gara ....

 

 

Fonte: Aviationweek.com

 

Duels In The Sky

 

By Bill Sweetman (Washington - June 3, 2011)

 

 

The European fighter development communitys views on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) have become more negative since 2005-06, and this is not, primarily, the result of marketing. The commentary expressed in offline meetings at conferences and shows is much more negative than on-the-record statements suggest.

 

People at Saab, Eurofighter and Dassault are of one voice on JSF and do not believe it will deliver its promised affordability, whether in acquisition, upgrades or operational cost, or that it will deliver capability on its present schedule. They expect that when JSF emerges from development, its stealth technology will be less valuable than expected, and that it will be inferior in other respects to European products.

 

The non-competitive selections of the JSF by the Netherlands, Norway and Canada are attributed to three main factors: political pressure by the U.S. (suspected for years but confirmed in 2010 by WikiLeaks), U.S.-oriented air forces, and political vacillation enabled by the fact that full-rate production JSFs are not available for order.

 

This worldview underpins the Europeans determination to keep their programs alive until the JSF program runs its course, or unravels, as they expect it to.

 

Indias decision to eliminate all but two contenders for its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement was a blow to Boeing and Saab, the companies in the losing group who had reason to hold out most hope in the competition (see p. 21). For the survivors, Eurofighter (Typhoon) and Dassault (Rafale), it means a bruising duel to win the contract andfor the winnera major challenge to fulfill it.

 

Indian officials say the winners scored highest on technical grounds, which is not surprising. Typhoon and Rafale are larger and more powerful than Saabs Gripen. The former is better at high altitude and the latter excels in payload and range. The European fighters also have a more contemporary aerodynamic design than Boeings Super Hornet.

 

But a word of cautionwhat is being offered in both cases is not what is coming off the production line today. Boeings Super Hornet proposal seems to have been close to the in-production F/A-18E/F Block 2, with the exception of General Electrics Enhanced Performance Engine (EPE) version of the F414. Gripen NG rests on a development program that is well underway.

 

Whether Rafale or Typhoon is selected, the program will aim to achieve several things simultaneously, including co-developing improvements such as an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and Meteor air-to-air missile (AAM) integration; dealing with obsolescence issues that are inevitable in long development cycles; transfering technology and launching joint indigenous production; and transplanting a complex all-digital aircraft into the Indian air force, all on a tight timescale.

 

If Rafale wins, and is also successful in Brazil, Dassault and its partnersSafran and Thaleswill be doing much the same thing, 9,000 mi. from India.

 

Good luck with that. The Indian customer, however, may take the view that the burden of risk will fall on the contractorand ultimately its domestic government stakeholder, which is unlikely to want to see problems erupt into public finger-pointing.

 

Boeing and Saab, meanwhile, can take comfort in depicting the Indian decision as something less than an outright repudiation of their approach to fighter design and the market. Boeing can present it as a choice to not rely on the U.S. for a principal weapon system, and Saab can point out that either finalist represents a move to closer ties with the major powers of Europe.

 

The current competitive situation of the three Euro-canard fighters, however, is shaped by economic, operational, technical and historic factors, and whether one or all survive into the 2020s as viable programs depends on all of them.

 

The historic factor dates to the mid-1980s, when France and the Eurofighter partners went their separate ways. Germany and the U.K. argued that one-nation programs no longer had the critical mass to compete with those from the U.S. France believed multinational programs without a clear leadership structure were impossibly cumbersome.

 

Both arguments were right.

 

Rafale works, but is being built at such slow rates that costs are high. To increase rates would be to starve other national programs of resources. Typhoons production and upgrade program has been successively delayed and restructured as the sponsoring nations have wrangled over how much should be spent on each step, and when.

 

Sweden escaped these outcomes because it had always structured its fighter programs differently. Design, integration and most manufacturing remained in Sweden, but subsystems such as the engine, radar and weapons were co-developed with foreign partners or imported. Combined with a uniquely authoritative and highly skilled government arms-development agency, Gripens development has been affordable on a national basis.

 

Technically and operationally, Rafale and Typhoon are more different than the distant view suggests. At its conception, Typhoon was expected to enter service at a point where Tornado, developed by three of its four partners, would be at its mid-life point. Combined with the emerging threat of the MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27, this drove the design toward air-combat performance, with a configuration that accommodated large radar and a standard, low-drag, six-missile load-out, and aerodynamics and propulsion optimized for agility (including supersonic maneuver) and acceleration.

 

The RAF considers the Typhoon second only to the Lockheed Martin F-22 in the air-to-air regime. Armed with Meteor ramjet-powered AAMs and equipped with a high-end infrared search-and-track (IRST) system, it will be more formidable yet. The problem is that few customers face adversaries with large or modern fighter forces.

 

Also, there is a difference of approach among the four Typhoon nations. The U.K. has recognized since the early 2000s that the Typhoon will have to take over some or all Tornado missions and developed an interim air-to-ground precision-strike capability. But the other partners have not seen this as an urgent need (and are less involved with air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), so funding for definitive solutions has been slow to materialize.

 

Nonetheless, the Typhoon team continues to promote future variants, including evolved designs with thrust vector control (TVC)which, among other things, improves handling with heavy external loadsand even a carrier-based version, which is of interest to India (and to the U.K. if JSF has problems). TVC is linked to carrier landing capability, as it permits a trimmed approach at a lower angle of attack and overcomes a problem with earlier Seaphoon studiesthe big radome that interposed itself between the pilots eyes and the ship.

 

Rafale, by contrast, was designed to permit a one-type air force for France, including the navy, with missions ranging from close air support to nuclear strike. The result was a small aircraft with the ability to carry a large external load and lower top-end performance than Typhoon. Another tradeoff was to accept less radar range in return for flexibility and light weight, with the relatively small passive phased array of the RBE2.

 

The Rafale has impressive capabilities, including discretion, which the French prefer to the term stealth. Rafale visibly shows more marks of low-observables technology than its contemporaries, and there is evidence that its Thales Spectra electronic warfare system has an active cancellation mode.

 

The Rafale team has, since the mid-2000s, done reasonably well at keeping its plans to mature and upgrade the aircraft on schedule. It can self-designate with the GBU-12 laser-guided bomb and carries the Sagem AASM extended-range, precision-guided weapon family. For the destruction of enemy air defenses mission, presentations show one Rafale targeting with radar from outside lethal range, while another approaches in terrain cover and delivers a pop-up AASM. The latest version to be tested is the imaging-IR model. Rafale is also operational with the Thales Areos multiband, long-range oblique reconnaissance pod.

 

Stealth, meanwhile, appears to be the hallmark of Gripen development, in that it is moving forward under a shroud of non-publicity. Sweden has taken the strategic decision to retain a small but capable air force, which will be based on Gripen until at least 2040. The only currently planned route to that goal is through the JAS 39E/F Gripen NG.

 

The next milestone is the return to flight of the Gripen Demo prototype, equipped with the E/Fs new avionics system, designed to reduce the cost of upgrades by partitioning mission systems from flight-critical functions. Selex Galileo is pushing forward with the Skywards-G IRSTthe first system of its type to operate in dual IR bandsand the Raven ES-05, the first wide-angle AESA.

 

The first new-build Gripen NG is due to fly in 2012. Reports describe stealth enhancements including diverterless inlets. The enhanced performance (EPE) engine would be a useful additionat its highest reported rating, its non-afterburning output would be over 90% of the maximum thrust of the C/Ds RM12 engine, although Saab may elect to take a smaller thrust boost combined with longer engine life to reduce ownership cost. GE claims that the EPE is relatively low-risk.

 

There's a lot of work to be done if European programs are to remain viable, but so far, industry considers it worthwhile.

 

Edited by TT-1 Pinto

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A quanto sembra la ragione della scelta caduta sui due mezzi europei è -anche e soprattutto-tecnica, credo sia la prima volta che in via ufficiale o semi-ufficiale vengano messe in evidenza, se non "pecche", almeno alcune caratteritiche non eccelse di armamenti americani rispetto a concorrenti europei

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veramente la ragione è una visione arcaica del combattimento aereo da parte degli indiani, senza dimenticare che gli europei sono disposti a vendersi anche l'anima, come hanno palesemente dichiarato, pur di vendere i loro aerei, buoni ma nati vecchi. mica poco per un paese affamato di know-how e che è incapace di costruirsi un proprio aereo...

il resto sono vane speranze delle suddette industrie: una volta entrato in scena il JSF, non ci sarà trippa per gatti e loro lo sanno fin troppo bene.

Edited by vorthex

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.... il resto sono vane speranze delle suddette industrie: una volta entrato in scena il JSF, non ci sarà trippa per gatti e loro lo sanno fin troppo bene ....

Il fatto è che il programma JSF, piagato da ritardi ed escalation di costi, è ancora lontano dal dare i suoi frutti ed è ancora prematuro sapere se le prestazioni che vengono attualmente prospettate saranno infine rispettate in pieno.

Senza contare che taluni paesi, quali India, Giappone e Corea del Sud, hanno necessità più urgenti di altri di mettere in linea nuovi aerei da combattimento e potrebbe essere rischioso acquistare un prodotto non del tutto maturo e tuttora gravato da incognite.

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Senza contare che taluni paesi, quali India, Giappone e Corea del Sud, hanno necessità più urgenti di altri di mettere in linea nuovi aerei da combattimento e potrebbe essere rischioso acquistare un prodotto non del tutto maturo e tuttora gravato da incognite.

bhe, l'India potrebbe comprare una macchina con molti sistemi ancora da sviluppare e non del tutto matura come l'EFA, un pò meno il Rafale. proprio per questo ha fatto così specie tale scelta e, c'è poco da fare, hanno scelto queste macchine perchè il trasferimento di tecnologie è altissimo, non perchè arriverebbero prima di Super Hornet e soci... ci credo poco alla storiella del combattimento WVR (non che le macchine europee non siano ottimi dogfighters, ma è davvero un discorso un pò vecchiotto).

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Secondo me, oltre ovviamente al discorso trasferimento di tecnologie che è il vero discriminatore in questo concorso, è anche vero che la IAF abbia una visione datata del combattimento aereo, altrimenti non si sognerebbe neanche di mettere in linea tutti quei modelli e di lanciare lo sviluppo di un caccia leggero stealth.

 

L'articolo è interessante poichè mette a confronto le caratteristiche degli aeromobili abbastanza oggettivamente, anche se non dice nulla di nuovo. Dassalut potrebbe raccogliere i frutti dell'aver sviluppato da subito il Rafale come multiruolo, o potrebbe rimanerci fragata per lo stesso motivo. Il Rafale è sicuramente "più multiruolo" e più maturo del Typhoon ma non gode dello stesso appoggio politico ed industriale, senza considerare che proprio la sua configurazione da "terraiolo" studiata su misura della Francia e la panoplia di armamenti per lo più indigeni francesi lo rende un po' meno appetibile. Chi vivrà vedrà, per il momento possono rimanere solo chiacchiere.

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IMHOi l'india avrebbe già scelto ma, sta tirando sul prezzo e mettendo d'accordo i partiti politici che in parlamento dovranno votare.

 

la scelta sarebbe l EFa ,questo perché in questi giorni abbiamo letto di acquisti di consolazione per gli americani (C-17 ,C130J ) e francesi (upgrade dei mirage) non vi sono stati acquisti dai paesi partner di eurofighter, segno che potrebbe far ben sperare.

 

 

la politica degli acquisti indiana a questo punto sarebbe simile a quella saudita

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Ma Saab ci spera ancora ....

 

DATE: 09/06/11

SOURCE:Flight International

 

Saab keeps watch on Indian fighter contest

 

By Craig Hoyle

 

Saab has not given up hope of winning the Indian air force's medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contest, despite having failed to make the service's shortlist when it narrowed the field to two European models early last month.

 

"We were not selected - at least not yet," said Saab chief executive Håkan Buskhe. Attributing New Delhi's "rather surprising decision" to concerns over the developmental status of his company's Gripen NG, he said "what we can do is give them our explanation if we feel they have misjudged something".

 

Speaking in London in late May, Buskhe said: "We have a list of things that they have some questions about, and we have been looking at those."

 

India narrowed its MMRCA contest to the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon, effectively eliminating the Gripen NG, Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Lockheed Martin F-16 and RSK MiG-35 from the $10 billion-plus, 126-aircraft deal.

 

But with extended bids from the remaining contenders valid only until late December, Saab has decided to maintain a presence in support of the campaign in India. "We will wait and see," said Buskhe.

 

The Saab official also was part of a business delegation that accompanied Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt to Brazil last month. "We have a fair chance to make it," Buskhe said, referring to Saab's campaign to offer the Gripen NG to meet the nation's F-X2 fighter requirement.

 

"We believe we have an extremely strong offer, with the transfer of technology and co-operation with Brazilian industry." The company again faces competition from the Rafale and Super Hornet, with a decision now expected during 2012.

 

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In effetti mantenere un osservatore in zona potrebbe rivelarsi una mossa con poca spesa e molta resa, non si può mai sapere. Dice bene il responsabile Saab: "We will wait and see."

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A seguito di questa notizia ....

 

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/06/03/357566/tellis-us-fighters-lost-mmrca-contract-due-to-technical.html

 

.... le aziende americane eliminate dalla competizione si dichiarano soddisfatte dei chiarimenti forniti loro dall'Indian Air Force ....

 

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/07/15/359543/us-fighter-companies-satisfied-after-mmrca-downselect.html

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Pradeep Vasant Naik, Capo di Stato Maggiore (uscente) dell'Indian Air Force, annuncia che la scelta avverrà nel giro di poche settimane ....

.... e il contratto verrà assegnato al miglior offerente ....

 

34fco6p.jpg

 

Fonte: Aerospace Daily and Defense Report (AW&ST)

 

India May Pick Fighter Contest Winner Soon

 

By Jay Menon (July 27, 2011)

 

 

NEW DELHI — India is likely to announce the winner of its $11 billion competition to furnish its air force with 126 combat jets in the next five to six weeks.

 

“The next step is to call vendors and open up the commercial bids. Of the two manufacturers left in the fray for the Medium-Multirole Combat Aircraft [MMRCA], we will [determine the lowest bidder] in the next five to six weeks,” Indian Air Force (IAF) chief P.V. Naik said July 26. As per India’s defense procurement procedures, the lowest bidder wins the deal.

 

The Eurofighter Typhoon is competing with the French Dassault Rafale in the race to supply the MMRCA to the IAF. The IAF has already “completed the benchmarking” of the two aircraft, which were downselected in April of this year from among six contenders.

 

Naik says the IAF has completed benchmarking, while the Technical Offset Evaluation Committee is due to submit its report to the defense ministry. The ministry has to accept that benchmarking, after which the cost negotiations committee will open the commercial bids.

 

“I have been very upbeat about it. I hope it comes through,” says Naik, who is due to retire at the end of this month.

 

Naik says the IAF does not have a favorite between the two competing aircraft. “The contract will go to the lowest offer when the commercial bids are opened.

 

The tender was issued in August 2007, and after several grueling flight and weapons trials, the IAF in April eliminated from the competition Boeing’s F/A-18, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, Russia’s MiG-35 and the Swedish Gripen.

 

The tender also has an option to increase the order by another 63 aircraft for a total of 189 at the cost negotiated for the 126 jets in the initial order. The first 18 of the 126 jets will be bought in flyaway condition, and the remaining 108 will be manufactured by Bengaluru-based Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. under a technology transfer agreement.

 

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In Svizzera Dassault ha presentato l'offerta più alta nella nota competizione a tre (c'erano anche i due finalisti "indiani"). Faccio notare che in India l' industria aeronautica francese è presente in modo importante...

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Io per quanto mi sforzi non riesco a trovare il senso dell'acquisto di un caccia della classe del typhoon/rafale, nè tecnicamente nè economicamente. Mi spiego: l'india avrà il T50 nel ruolo aria-aria (ma che avrà sicuramente notevoli capacità aria-suolo) che comporterà un forte esborso finanziario (anche perchè sta partecipando allo sviluppo), ha già il SU 30 nel ruolo aria-suolo (ma che ha anche capacità aria-aria) e sta mettendo in linea il Tejas (che fa un pò di tutto). Che senso ha un altro caccia? e del costo del rafale/typhoon poi, mica qualcosa di economico. e dove prendono tutti sti soldi se si considera che stanno costruendo anche portaerei, sommergibili, carri armati ecc. ecc.?

 

questo ci deve far capire che il futuro è dei paesi che un tempo erano sottosviluppati,e che ora si arricchiscono a ritmi vertiginosi. D'altronde abbiamo dominato il mondo per tanto tempo,è ora i passare la mano a qualcun altro.

Edited by red giacomo

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questo ci deve far capire che il futuro è dei paesi che un tempo erano sottosviluppati,e che ora si arricchiscono a ritmi vertiginosi. D'altronde abbiamo dominato il mondo per tanto tempo,è ora i passare la mano a qualcun altro.

 

 

Beh, Cina e India non sono mai stati Paesi da terzo mondo. Entrambi hanno una storia e una cultura millenarie ma, soprattutto, occorre ricordarsi che assieme contano 2,5 miliardi di abitanti. Mi sembra logico che le loro economie si accrescano rapidamente. Rimane il fatto che, soprattutto l'India, rimane con sacche di povertà incredibili. Il miglioramento delle sue forze armate è legittimo , ma non a qualsiasi costo. Si tratta, per loro, di acquistare il "buono" alle migliori condizioni. La scelta del PC-7 (aereo concepito 40 anni fa) è significativa. Speculare se sia meglio tecnicamente il Typhoon o il Rafale ha poco senso: entrambi sono molto costosi e la scelta cadrà (sembra) su quello che costa meno.

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Rimane il fatto che, soprattutto l'India, rimane con sacche di povertà incredibili. Il miglioramento delle sue forze armate è legittimo, ma non a qualsiasi costo.

Legittimo anche a causa della vicinanza di paesi coi quali ha un forte contenzioso territoriale che in passato, e in più di un'occasione, è sfociato in vere e proprie azioni belliche ....

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Il meno costoso? E' a questo che si riduce ora la meticolosa valutazione tecnica che ha portato all'esclusione degli altri contendenti?

 

MAH.

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Dubito fortemente che alla fine la motivazione della scelta sia esclusivamente di carattere economico,anche perché dei 6 aerei in gara i 3 veramente economici (F16,J39,MiG-35) li hanno esclusi piuttosto in fretta... Ed alla fine credo si orienteranno sul Rafale per la già avviata collaborazione con Dassault ed il minore sviluppo necessario per un'eventuale versione navale dello stesso... A Saint-Cloud stappano tutto lo champagne dell'annata se riescono a vendere un Rafale all'estero,mi sa... :lol:

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e che vendita all'estero sarà x i francesi (ammesso e non concesso che vinca il Rafale). Di colpo raddoppieranno gli aerei ordinati :blink:

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Dubito fortemente che alla fine la motivazione della scelta sia esclusivamente di carattere economico,anche perché dei 6 aerei in gara i 3 veramente economici (F16,J39,MiG-35) li hanno esclusi piuttosto in fretta... Ed alla fine credo si orienteranno sul Rafale per la già avviata collaborazione con Dassault ed il minore sviluppo necessario per un'eventuale versione navale dello stesso... A Saint-Cloud stappano tutto lo champagne dell'annata se riescono a vendere un Rafale all'estero,mi sa... :lol:

 

la versiona navale del Rafale esiste, il Rafale M

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